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Abstract
This Essay proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes the effects of nuclear weapons and the
many calls in recent years from across the political spectrum for the abolition of nuclear weapons,
including such calls by President Obama both as presidential candidate and as president. Part
II describes the Obama NPR and the many respects in which it backs away from the avowed
objective of abolition by continuing the United States’ Cold War posture, which was premised on
the putative legitimacy of nuclear weapons and deterrence and in defiance of international law.
Part III suggests how a nuclear posture committed to abolition and compliance with international
law might differ from the Obama NPR and highlights fundamental inconsistencies between the
NPR and the Action Plan of the 2010 NPT Conference supported by the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
Law is a means of controlling, directing, and constraining
potential actions. If law as an institution is to have international
relevance, it must apply to critical issues. The survival of
humanity depends on how threats posed by nuclear weapons are
addressed. Science, in the service of excessive military means of
pursuing peace and security, has placed civilization at risk. Law
has a duty to control this risk.
At the Security Council Summit of September 24, 2009, the
former President of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias Sanchez, a Nobel
Peace Laureate, described the current historical moment: "While
we sleep, death is awake. Death keeps watch from the warehouses
that store more than 23,000 nuclear warheads, like 23,000 eyes
open and waiting for a moment of carelessness."'
These devices are possessed by the five permanent members
of the United Nations ("UN") Security Council-China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States-which are
also members of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty ("NPT"),
and by India, Israel, Pakistan, and probably North Korea.2 The
United States alone has over 5000 nuclear weapons in its
deployed stockpile and an additional 4000 stored in an
assembled state.3 Russia has over 4500 in its deployed stockpile
and also over 7000 stored in an assembled state.4 The global
1. U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6191st mtg., at 4, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6191 (Sept. 24, 2009).
2. Status of World Nuclear Forces, FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/
programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html (last updated May 26, 2010).
3. See Hans M. Kristensen, United States Discloses Size of Nuclear Weapons Stockpile,
FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS STRATEGIC SECURITY BLOG (May 3, 2010), http://www.fas.org/
blog/ssp/2010/05/stockpilenumber.php.
4. Robert S. Norris & Hans M. Kristensen, Russian Nuclear Forces, 2010, BULL. OF
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,Jan./Feb. 2010, at 74, 74.
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stockpile of deployed weapons, however frightening, can be
quantified with a credibly high degree of accuracy.5 But the
destructive magnitude of a bomb dwarfs imagination. A onemegaton device is approximately eighty times the destructive
capacity of the relatively small bomb that leveled Hiroshima. To
get an idea of this destructive capacity, Ambassador Thomas
Graham suggests imagining a train with TNT stretching from Los
Angeles to New York. 6 The Soviet Union produced a fifty7
megaton bomb in the 1960s, an equivalent of 5000 Hiroshimas.
It is scant solace that most deployed weapons are only in the
range of several hundred kilotons, since a 300 kiloton weapon
represents twenty-three Hiroshimas.8
Former CIA Director Stansfield Turner described the actual
effects of one bomb:
The fireball created by a nuclear explosion will be much
hotter than the surface of the sun for fractions of a second
and will radiate light and heat, as do all objects of very high
temperature. Because the fireball is so hot and close to the
earth, it will deliver enormous amounts of heat and light to
the terrain surrounding the detonation point, and it will be
hundreds or thousands of times brighter than the sun at
noon. If the fireball is created by the detonation of a 1-MT
(megaton) nuclear weapon, for example, within roughly
eight- to nine-tenths of a second[,] each section of its surface
will be radiating about three times as much heat and light as
a comparable area of the sun itself. The intense flash of light
and heat from the explosion of a 550-KT weapon can
carbonize exposed skin and cause clothing to ignite. At a
range of three miles, for instance, surfaces would fulminate
and recoil as they emanate flames, and even particles of sand
would explode like pieces of popcorn from the rapid heating
of the fireball. At three and a half miles, where the blast
pressure would be about 5 psi, the fireball could ignite
clothing on people, curtains and upholstery in homes and
5. Hans M. Kristensen & Alicia Goldberg, Status of Nuclear Weapons States and Their
Nuclear Capabilities,FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, (March 2008), http://www.fas.org/nuke/
guide/summary.htm.
6. AMBASSADOR THOMAS GRAHAM, JR., COMMON SENSE ON WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION 10 (2004).
7. Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, http://www.nti.
org/fCwmd4l1/fla4_1.html (last updated Aug. 2010).
8. Id.

600 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 34:595

offices, and rubber tires on cars. At four miles, it could
blister aluminum surfaces, and at six to seven miles it could
still set fire to dry leaves and grass. This flash of incredibly
intense, nuclear-driven sunlight could simultaneously set an
uncountable number of fires over an area of close to 100
square miles.9
Experts suggest that a regional nuclear exchange-for
example, between India and Pakistan-would have a devastating
impact on the planet's climate, causing a global famine that
could kill one billion people. 0 This cold scientific data does not
give as powerful a testimony as the simple eye-witness accounts
recorded by Charles Pelligrino in The Last Trainfrom Hiroshima,
as he describes the so-called "[a]nt-walking alligators" as
survivors who "were now eyeless and faceless-with their heads
transformed into blackened alligator hides displaying red holes,
indicating mouths."" He continues, "The alligator people did
not scream. Their mouths could not form the sounds. The noise
they made was worse than screaming. They uttered a continuous
murmur-like locusts on a midsummer night. One man,
staggering on charred stumps of legs, was carrying a dead baby
upside down."12
Can the use of weapons that have such horrific effects on
humans and the environment be compatible with the dictates of
human conscience and with international humanitarian law
("IHL")? For even in war, law and its rule cannot be ignored if
we are to remain civilized. The current readiness to use nuclear
weapons13 places us all under a cloud that could burst and within
9. STANSFIELD TURNER, CAGING THE NUCLEAR GENIE: AN AMERICAN CHALLENGE
FOR GLOBAL SECURITY 127-28 (1997).
10. See Steven Starr, Op-Ed, The Climatic Consequences of Nuclear War, BULL. OF
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Mar. 12, 2010, available at http://www.thebulletin.org/webedition/op-eds/the-climatic-consequences-of-nuclear-war (citing Alan Robock & Owen
Brian Toon, Local Nuclear War, GlobalSuffering, SCI. AM.,Jan. 2010, at 74, 79).
11. CHARLES PELLEGRINO, THE LAST TRAIN FROM HIROSHIMA: THE SURVIVORS
LOOK BACK 178 (2010).
12. Id.

13. Charles

J. Moxley, Jr. sets forth the existential reality of the preparedness

exercised ostensibly to bring us peace and security:
Train military personnel to use nuclear weapons; conduct regular exercises
reinforcing the training; put the weapons and controls in the hands of the
military personnel; provide them with contingency plans as to the
circumstances in which they are to use the weapons; instill them with a sense
of mission as to the lawful and significant purposes of such weapons in
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a few hours end everything we value. If law is to have any
significance, it must meaningfully constrain this danger.
With this precept in mind, when the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ"), in its landmark 1996 Nuclear Weapons advisory
opinion, addressed the legality of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons, it affirmed the application of IHL to nuclear weapons. 14
When parties to the NPT met in May 2010, they unanimously
reaffirmed "the need for all States at all times to comply with
international
including
law,
international
applicable
humanitarian law."1 5 This politically powerful commitment was
obtained through arduous negotiations.' 6 There is a pressing
need to promptly set forth exactly what the requirements are to
bring the current policies of nuclear weapons states into
compliance with IHL and the NPT.

upholding the national defense and honor; make them part of an elite corps;
have them stand at the ready for decades at a time waiting for the call; instill
firm military discipline; make the weapons a publicly advertised centerpiece of
the nation's military strategy; locate the weapons so as to leave them
vulnerable to preemptive attack; villainize the enemy as godless and evil or as a
rogue and terrorist nation; convey to military personnel that the weapons will
be a major target of enemy attack and that it may be necessary to use them
quickly before they can be destroyed; warn the enemy that, in the event of
attack, the weapons may or will be used; inculcate in military personnel the
notion of intra-war deterrence whereby nuclear weapons may need to be used
following an enemy attack to deter further escalating attacks, give the military
insufficient alternate conventional capacity to defeat the enemy attack; cut
numerous nuclear weapons bearing units and control centers off from each
other and from contact with higher authorities; create a situation of
hopelessness where the whole society is about to be destroyed, at least unless
these weapons can be gotten off fast to destroy and restrain the enemy; give
the President and other upper level command authorities only an imperfect
understanding of the options and repercussions and accord them only 5 to 10
minutes, or even a matter of seconds, to decide, against the background of
SIOP [Single Integrated Operating Plan] based computer and other plans
decades in the making and ostensibly reflecting a broad historical consensus as
to approach--do any number of these things, and the stage is set for the actual
use of the nuclear weapons.
CHARLES J. MOXLEY, JR., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST
COLD WAR WORLD 535-36 (2000).
14. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 11 42, 86 (July 8).
15. 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, May 3-28, 2010, Final Document, pts. 1, 19, U.N. Doc.
NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. 1) (2010) [hereinafter FinalDocument].
16. See generally Rebecca Johnson, Assessing the 2010 NPT Review Conference, BULL.
OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,Jan./Feb. 2010, at 1.
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This Article addresses the requirements of IHL and the NPT
and applies those requirements to contemporary state practice. It
discusses IHL in Part I and the NPT in Part II. The result, the
Article concludes, is that such practice falls far short of the legal
requirements. In short, review of the matter reveals that the use
of nuclear weapons would violate IHL and that the threat of such
use, including under the policy of nuclear deterrence, similarly
violates such law. Analysis further reveals that the nuclear weapon
states' existing obligation to bring their policies into compliance
with IHL is reinforced by the NPT disarmament obligation as
spelled out by the 2010 NPT Review Conference, in particular by
its declaration of the need to comply with IHL. The most
fundamental implication of the incompatibility of the threat or
use of nuclear weapons with IHL is the energetic and expeditious
fulfillment of the NPT obligation to achieve the global
elimination of nuclear weapons through good-faith negotiations.

I. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

17

This Part first sets forth the substance of the requirements of
IHL applicable to nuclear weapons and then applies such
requirements to contemporary state practice. Accordingly,
Section B starts with a discussion of the key rules of distinction,
proportionality, and necessity and the corollary rule of
controllability, as well as international law on reprisals and on
individual responsibility. Section C then addresses the
application of this body of law to the use and threat of use of
nuclear weapons, and Section D discusses the US arguments for
how some uses of nuclear weapons could be lawful under
international law. Before delving into the law, however, Section A
sets forth a further discussion of the applicable facts.

17. Portions of this Part are adapted from CHARLES

J.

MOXLEY, JR., NUCLEAR

wEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD (2000) and from

Charles J. Moxley, Jr., The Sword in the Mirror-The Lawfulness of North Korea's Use and
Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons Based on the United States' Legitimization of Nuclear Weapons,
27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1379 (2003). The material has been updated since the earlier
works to include the most recent military manuals.
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Nuclear Weapons Facts Relevant to the Application of International
HumanitarianLaw

Obviously the law has to be applied to the facts. The facts
about nuclear weapons are now widely familiar. The ICJ, in its
Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, defined the "unique
characteristics" of nuclear weapons:
[The

Court] ... notes

that

nuclear

weapons

are

explosive devices whose energy results from the fusion or
fission of the atom. By its very nature, that process, in
nuclear weapons as they exist today, releases not only
immense quantities of heat and energy, but also powerful
and prolonged radiation. According to the material before
the Court, the first two causes of damage are vastly more
powerful than the damage caused by other weapons, while
the phenomenon of radiation is said to be peculiar to
nuclear weapons. These characteristics render the nuclear
weapon potentially catastrophic. The destructive power of
nuclear weapons cannot be contained in either space or
time. They have the potential to destroy all civilization and
the entire ecosystem of the planet.
The radiation released by a nuclear explosion would
affect health, agriculture, natural resources and demography
over a very wide area. Further, the use of nuclear weapons
would be a serious danger to future generations. Ionizing
radiation has the potential to damage the future
environment, food and marine ecosystem, and to cause
genetic defects and illness in future generations.
In consequence ... it is imperative for the Court to take
account of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons,
and in particular their destructive capacity, their capacity to
cause untold human suffering, and their ability to cause
damage to generations to come.18
Other judges in their individual decisions in the ICJ's
Nuclear Weapons case elaborated on the effects of nuclear
weapons. Judge Weeramantry noted the danger of nuclear
winter, whereby fires from exploded nuclear weapons could
release hundreds of millions of tons of soot in the atmosphere,
causing huge clouds and debris, blotting out the sun and

18. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226,

11 35-36.
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destroying agriculture.19 He noted that radiation from nuclear
weapons is not containable in space or time and is unique as a
source of "continuing danger to human health, even long after
its use," given that the half-lives of the by-products of a nuclear
explosion last thousands of years. 20 Judge Weeramantry also
noted the electromagnetic pulse as a further effect of the use of
nuclear weapons, stating that this very sudden and intensive burst
of energy
throws
all
electronic
devices,
including
communications lines such as nuclear command and control
centers, out of action.2 1
Judge Koroma noted, with respect to the atomic attacks on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki:
Over 320,000 people who survived but were affected by
radiation still suffer from various malignant tumours caused
by radiation, including leukaemia, thyroid cancer, breast
cancer, lung cancer, gastric cancer, cataracts and a variety of
other after-effects. More than half a century after the
disaster, they are still said to be undergoing medical
examinations and treatment.22
Quoting former Secretary General of the United Nations
Javier P6rez de Cu6l1ar, Judge Shahabuddeen stated:
The world's stockpile of nuclear weapons today is
equivalent to 16 billion tons of TNT. As against this, the
entire devastation of the Second World War was caused by
the expenditure of no more than 3 million tons of
munitions. In other words, we possess a destructive capacity
of more than 5,000 times what caused 40 to 50 million deaths
not too long ago. It should suffice to kill every man, woman
and child 10 times over.23

19. Id. at 456 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion in Legality of
the Use lty a State of Nuclear Weapons in an Armed Conflict,Judge Koroma stated that "in a
conflict involving the use of a single nuclear weapon, such a weapon could have the
destructive power of a million times that of the largest conventional weapon." Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 68, 173 (July 8).
20. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, at 451
(Weeramantry,J., dissenting).
(citing DicrIONNAIRE
21. Id. at 467-68 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting)
ENCYCLOPEDIQUE D'ELECTRONIQUE).
22. Id. at 567 (Koroma, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 382 (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) (quoting Javier Perez de Cu6llar,
Sec'y-Gen. of the U.N, Statement at the University of Pennsylvania (Mar. 24, 1983), in 6
DISARMAMENT, no. 1, at 91).
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effects of nuclear weapons, Judge

To classify these effects as being merely a byproduct is not to
the point; they can be just as extensive as, if not more so
than, those immediately produced by blast and heat. They
cause unspeakable sickness followed by painful death, affect
the genetic code, damage the unborn, and can render the
earth uninhabitable. These extended effects may not have
military value for the user, but this does not lessen their
gravity or the fact that they result from the use of nuclear
weapons. This being the case, it is not relevant for present
purposes to consider whether the injury produced is a
byproduct or secondary effect of such use.
Nor is it always a case of the effects being immediately
inflicted but manifesting their consequences in later
ailments; nuclear fall-out may exert an impact on people
long after the explosion, causing fresh injury to them in the
course of time, including injury to future generations. The
weapon continues to strike for years after the initial blow,
thus presenting the disturbing and unique portrait of war
being waged by a present generation on future ones-on
future ones with which its successors could well be at peace. 24
Judge Shahabuddeen further noted
indiscriminate effects of nuclear weapons:

the

extreme

The preamble to the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, Additional
Protocol II of which was signed and ratified by the five
[nuclear weapons states], declared that the Parties were
convinced
That the incalculable destructive power of nuclear
weapons has made it imperative that the legal
prohibition of war should be strictly observed in
practice if the survival of civilization and of mankind
itself is to be assured.
That nuclear weapons, whose terrible effects are
suffered, indiscriminately and inexorably, by military
forces and civilian population alike, constitute, through
the persistence of the radioactivity they release, an
attack on the integrity of the human species and

24. Id.

and
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even

render

the
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whole

earth

With such facts in mind, this Part next looks at the law.
B.

Scope of InternationalHumanitarianLaw

There is a robust body of conventional and customary
international law governing the use and threat of use of nuclear
weapons. This body of law is recognized by states throughout the
world, including the United States and other nuclear weapons
states, and its principles have been explicitly articulated by the
International Court of Justice. This is the body of international
law known variously as IHL, the law of armed conflict, the law of
war, and jus in bello, terms that are generally synonymous. 26 This
centuries-old body of law applies to the use of all weapons,
including nuclear weapons. There are also numerous
conventions, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty2 7
("NPT"), that apply specifically to nuclear weapons.
At the broadest level, IHL not only establishes limits on the
use and threat of use of weapons, including nuclear weapons, but
establishes and defines war crimes, crimes against the peace, and
crimes against humanity (international crimes for which
individuals are subject to criminal sanctions, including the death
penalty).
Of central importance, this body of law regulates threats as
well as overt actions, making it unlawful for states-and
individuals acting on behalf of states-to threaten actions that
are contrary to IHL. This becomes of central significance to the
policy of nuclear deterrence, which is founded on the threat to
use nuclear weapons. IHL also includes vigorous provisions
governing the potential exposure to criminal prosecution of
individuals in the armed services, in government, and in industry
who act on behalf of or in conjunction with states in matters
involving weapons, including nuclear weapons.

25. Id. at 384 (Shahabuddeen,J., dissenting) (quoting Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 326, 328) [hereinafter
Treaty of Tlatelolco].
26. See id. at 256.
27. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
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This Article's statement of the applicable law, to take it out
of contention, is largely based on statements of such law by the
United States, including US statements of the law in its
arguments to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion and
in the US military manuals used for training US forces, planning
and conducting military operations, and evaluating the
performance of US personnel for legal purposes.2 8 These
statements of the applicable law, subject to certain exceptions
discussed below, accurately and fairly state the rules of IHL
applicable to the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. Also
considered are the written memoranda and oral presentations of
the three other declared nuclear weapons states that participated
in the Nuclear Weapons case-France 29 , Russia3 0 , and the United
28. See JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S DEPT., U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR
FORCE OPERATIONS AND THE LAW (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter AIR FORCE, OPERATIONS
AND THE LAw]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, DOCTRINE DOc. No. 2-1.9, TARGETING
(2006) [hereinafter AIR FORCE, TARGETING]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, DOCTRINE
DOc. No. 2-12, NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (2009) [hereinafter AIR FORCE, NUCLEAR
OPERATIONS]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, THE MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW
(2009) [hereinafter AIR FORCE, MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAw]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE
ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. FM27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956) (with Change
No. 1 (July 15, 1976)) [hereinafter ARMY, LAW OF LAND WARFARE]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE
ARMY, MANUAL NO. FM100-30, NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (1996); INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW
DEP'T, U.S. ARMYJUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK
(2010) [hereinafter ARMY, LAw OF WAR DESKBOOK]; INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAw DEP'T,
U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S LEGAL CTR. AND SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK (2010) [hereinafter ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAw HANDBOOK]; U.S. DEP'T OF
THE NAVY, NAVAL WAR PUB. No. 1-14M, THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
NAVAL OPERATIONS (2007) [hereinafter NAVAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK] (this manual
is issued by the U.S. Naval War College and applies to the Coast Guard, Navy, and
Marines); U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATION (1997) [hereinafter NAVAL
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK 1997 SUPPLEMENT]. Some earlier editions of US military
manuals and manuals that are no longer in effect still contain statements of
international law of continuing significance. See, e.g., JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB.
NO. 3-12, DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS (1995); JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
JOINT PUB. NO. 3-12.1, DOCTRINE FORJOINT THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, chs. 2, 2526, 30 (1996) [hereinafter JOINT THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE
AIR FORCE, PAMPHLET NO. 110-34, COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF ARMED
CONFLICT (1980) [hereinafter AIR FORCE, COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK]; U.S. DEP'T OF
THE AIR FORCE, PAMPHLET NO. 110-31, INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE CONDUCT OF ARMED
CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS (1976) [hereinafter AIR FORCE, MANUAL ON
INTERNATIONAL LAw]; U.S. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE
COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (1987) [hereinafter
NAVAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK 1989 SUPPLEMENT].
29. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
Written Statement of the Government of the French Republic (June 20, 1995), available
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Kingdom 3 ' (China did not participate)-the written and oral
presentations of Iran,3 2 and the written presentations of India33
and North Korea34 (Pakistan and Israel did not participate).36
Based upon review of such materials, the statements of IHL by
such states, to the extent the matter was addressed, were
generally consistent with the statements of such law by the
United States, as reflected herein, with the exception that France
remained silent on the application of IHL, contending instead

at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/8701.pdf; Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, Verbatim Record, 38-67 (Nov. 1, 1995, 10 a.m.),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/5927.pdf; Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, Verbatim Record, 18-27 (Nov. 2, 1995, 10
a.m.), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/5929.pdf.
30. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
Written Statement of the Government of the Russian Federation (June 19, 1995),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/8796.pdf; Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, Verbatim Record, 39-50 (Nov. 10, 1995, 10
a.m.), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/5939.pdf [hereinafter ICJ
Hearing, Nov. 10, 1995].
31. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
Written Statement of the Government of the United Kingdom (June 16, 1995), available
at http://www.icj-cij.rg/docket/files/95/8802.pdf [hereinafter Written Statement of
the Government of the United Kingdom]; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, Verbatim Record, 20-54 (Nov. 15, 1995, 10 a.m.), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/5947.pdf [hereinafter ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15,
1995].
32. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
Written Statement of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran (June 19, 1995),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/8678.pdf; Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, Verbatim Record, 16-41 (Nov. 6, 1995, 10
a.m.), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/5933.pdf.
33. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
Written Statement of the Government of India (June 20, 1995), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/8688.pdf.
34. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
Written Statement of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(May 18, 1995), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/8668.pdf.
35. There were actually two cases referred to the ICJ for an advisory opinion as to
the lawfulness of the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons: one referred by the
World Health Organization ("WHO") in 1993 and the other by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1995. The ICJ ultimately found that the WHO did not to have
standing to assert such a claim but proceeded to hear the case presented by the General
Assembly. While legal arguments were presented to the ICJ on international law issues in
both cases, this Article focuses on the papers submitted in connection with the General
Assembly case, since those statements were more complete and substantive than those
presented in connection with the WHO referral.
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that use of nuclear weapons in self-defense is permissible absent
an express prohibition.36
Some of the legal requirements may come as a surprise even
to leading public policy and nuclear weapons experts. The law
governing the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons has been
largely overlooked. Analyses of nuclear weapons issues by
governmental and private experts across the political spectrum
routinely fail to take into consideration the requirements of
international law. A current example is the fact that the Obama
Administration's wide-ranging efforts to address nuclear weapons
issues have been presented on the basis of policy and security
considerations, with little or no acknowledgement of the
requirements of international law.
Against this backdrop, the affirmation by states party to the
NPT at the 2010 Review Conference, regarding nuclear
disarmament, that there is a "need for all States at all times to
comply with applicable international law, including international
humanitarian law,"3 7 was the inspiration for this Article. That
unambiguous commitment should usher in a new era in which
the requirements of IHL define the creation, deployment, use,
and threat of use of nuclear weapons. In fact, it is the authors'
contention that this body of law renders the use and threat of use
of nuclear weapons unlawful and compels immediate progress to
obtain the elimination of the weapons.
C.

Main Corpus of InternationalHumanitarianLaw

The ICJ in its Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion stated that
this "body of legal prescriptions,"3 8 the "laws and customs of
war," are largely set forth in "one single complex system" known
as "international humanitarian law," a body of customary rulesmany of which have been codified in the "Hague Law" and the
36. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
Verbatim Record, 6 (Nov. 1, 1995), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/
5927.pdf (stating that the use of nuclear weapons is "authorized in the event of the
exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence"); John Burroughs,
Humanitarian Consequences, HumanitarianLaw: An Advance in Banning Use of Nuclear
Weapons,
NPT
NEws
IN REV.,
June
1,
2010,
at
8,
available at
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/NIR201O/No21.pdf.
37. Final Document, supra note 15, at 19.
38. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996

I.C.J. 226, 1 77 (July 8).
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"Geneva Law." 39 The court noted that the Hague Law consists of
codifications undertaken in The Hague (including the
Conventions of 1899 and 1907) that were based partly upon the
St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 and the results of the Brussels
Conference of 1874.40 This Hague Law, particularly the
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
("Hague Regulations"), "fixed the rights and duties of
belligerents in their conduct of operations and limited the
choice of methods and means of injuring the enemy in an
international armed conflict." 4 ' The Geneva Law, consisting of
codifications undertaken in Geneva (the Conventions of 1864,
1906, 1929, and 1949), protect "the victims of war" and aim "to
provide safeguards for disabled armed forces personnel and
persons not taking part in the hostilities." 4 2 The more recent
provisions of the Additional Protocols I and II of 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions regulating the conduct of hostilities "give
expression and attest to the unity and complexity" of IHL. 4 3
D.

Applicability of InternationalHumanitarianLaw to Nuclear
Weapons

The United States recognizes that the use of nuclear
weapons is subject to IHL, including the rules of
distinction/discrimination, proportionality, and necessity, and
the corollary requirement of controllability.44
39. Id. 1 75.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed ConflictsJune 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional
Protocol II]). For related explanatory materials, see MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES
FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMENTARY ON THE Two 1977 PROTOCOLS
ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949, at 312, 317 (1982).
44. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
Written Statement of the United States, 2, 7-47, (June 20, 1995), available at
US
ICJ Written
[hereinafter
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/8700.pdf
Statement] (prepared by Conrad K. Harper, Michael J. Matheson, Bruce C. Rashkow,
and John H. McNeill on behalf of the United States); see also NAVAL COMMANDER'S
HANDBOOK, supra note 28, § 10.1-10.2.1; AIR FORCE, NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note
28, at 8; ARMY, LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, at 18 (stating that, in the absence
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The 2007 Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations ("Naval Commander's Handbook") states that the use of
nuclear weapons "against enemy combatants and other military
objectives" is subject to the following principles:
[T] he right of the parties to the conflict to adopt means of
injuring the enemy is not unlimited; it is prohibited to
launch attacks against the civilian population as such; and
distinction must be made at all times between combatants
and civilians to the effect that the latter be spared as much as
possible.4 5
The Air Force's 2009 manual Nuclear Operations recognizes
that the use of nuclear weapons is subject to the principles of the
law of war generally.4 6 The manual states, "Under international
law, the use of a nuclear weapon is based on the same targeting
rules applicable to the use of any other lawful weapon, i.e., the
counterbalancing principles of military necessity, proportionality,
distinction and unnecessary suffering."47
The Air Force, in its 2006 manual Targeting,states that the
following questions are helpful in determining whether the use
of a weapon complies with the applicable rules: (1) "Is this target
a valid 'military objective'?"; (2) "Will the use of a particular
weapon used to strike a target cause unnecessary suffering?"; (3)
"Does the military advantage to be gained from striking a target
outweigh the anticipated incidental civilian loss of life and
property if this target is struck?"; (4) "Have we distinguished
between combatants and noncombatants; have we distinguished
between military objectives and protected property or places?"4 8
The Army, in its earlier manual InternationalLaw, stated that
the provisions of international conventional and customary law
that "may control the use of nuclear weapons" include: (1)
Article 23(a) of the Hague Regulations prohibiting poisons and
poisoned weapons; (2) the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which
prohibits the use not only of poisonous and other gases but also
of a customary rule of law or international convention restricting the employment of
atomic weapons, the use of such weapons cannot be deemed unlawful, although the
manual appears to recognize the subjugation of the use of such weapons to the
principles of moderation and necessity); infra Part I.F.d.
45. NAVAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28, § 10.2.1.
46. AIR FORCE, NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 28, at 8.

47. Id.
48. AIR FORCE, TARGETING, supra note 28, at 89-90.

612

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 34:595

of "analogous liquids, materials or devices"; (3) Article 23(c) of
the Hague Regulations, which prohibits weapons calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering; and (4) the 1868 Declaration of St.
Petersburg, which lists as contrary to humanity those weapons
that "needlessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or
render their death inevitable."4 9
In its written statement to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons
advisory opinion, the United States stated, "[T]he legality of use
[of nuclear weapons] depends on the conformity of the
particular use with the rules applicable to such weapons."5 0 The
memorandum goes on to say that this would depend on "the
characteristics of the particular weapon used and its effects, the
military requirements for the destruction of the target in
question and the magnitude of the risk to civilians."5 1
E.

Summary of the Main Rules of InternationalHumanitarianLaw
Applicable to Nuclear Weapons

The following is a summary of key rules of IHL applicable to
nuclear and other weapons.
The rule of distinction/discriminationprohibits the use of a
weapon that cannot discriminate in its effects between military
targets and noncombatant persons and objects. It is unlawful to
use weapons whose effects are incapable of being controlled and
therefore cannot be directed against a military target. If the state
cannot maintain such control over the weapon, it cannot ensure

49. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET No. 27-161-2, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAw
(1962), quoted in ELLIOTT L. MEYROWITZ, PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE
RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 31 (1990). This manual appears to have been
superseded, as it no longer shows up on lists of current manuals. See, e.g., Listing of
United States Army Field Manuals, http://www.enlisted.info/field-manuals (last visited

Feb. 15, 2011). The authors are not aware of any reason to believe that the requirements
of the Hague Regulations Article 23(a) and (c), the Geneva Protocol of 1925, or the
1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg, insofar as applicable to nuclear weapons, have
changed in any way since the issuance of the Army's manual INTERNATIONAL LAW.
50. See US ICJ Written Statement, supra note 44 at 2, 8-14 (citing THE LAw OF
LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, at 4 1 40(a)); Request by the World Health Organization
for an Advisory Opinion on the Question of the Legality under International Law and
the World Health Organization Constitution of the Use of Nuclear Weapons by a State
in War or Other Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, Written Statement of the United
States, 2, 16-21, Uune 10, 1994), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/93/
8770.pdf.
51. US ICJ Written Statement, supra note 44 at 2.
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that such use will comply with the rule of discrimination and may
not lawfully use the weapon.
The rule of proportionality prohibits the use of a weapon
whose potential collateral effects upon noncombatant persons or
objects would likely be disproportionate to the value of the
military advantage anticipated by the attack. The rule of
proportionality requires that a state using a weapon be able to
control the effects of the weapon. If the state cannot control such
effects, it cannot ensure that the collateral effects of the attack
will be proportional to the anticipated military advantage.
The rule of necessity provides that a state may only use such a
level of force as is necessary to achieve the military objective of
the particular strike. Any additional level of force is unlawful.
The corollary rule of controllabilityprovides that a state may not
use a weapon if its effects cannot be controlled because, in such
circumstances, it would be unable to believe that the particular
use of the weapon would comply with the rules of distinction,
proportionality, or necessity.
International law on reprisals provides, at a minimum, that a
state may not engage in even limited violations of the law of
armed conflict in response to an adversary's violation of such law,
unless such acts of reprisal would meet requirements of necessity
and proportionality and be solely intended to compel the
adversary to adhere to the law of armed conflict. The reprisal
must be necessary to achieve that purpose and proportionate to
the violation against which it is directed. These requirements of
necessity and proportionality for a lawful reprisal are analogous
to the requirements of necessity and proportionality (discussed
immediately below) for the lawful exercise of the right of selfdefense.
A state's right of self-defense is subject to requirements of
necessity and proportionality under customary international law
and the Charter of the United Nations. A state's use of force in
the exercise of self-defense is also subject to the requirements of
IHL, including the requirements of distinction, proportionality
and necessity, and the corollary requirement of controllability.
International law as to individual and command liability
provides that military, government, and even private industrial
personnel are subject to criminal conviction for violation of the
law of armed conflict if they knowingly or recklessly participate in
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or have supervisory responsibility over violators of the law of
armed conflict. Such potential criminal liability of commanders
extends not only to what the commanders knew but also to what
they "should have known" concerning the violation of law.
F.

Discussion of the Rules ofInternationalLaw Applicable to Nuclear
Weapons
1. Rule of Distinction/Discrimination

The rule of distinction/discriminationprohibits the use of a
weapon whose effects cannot distinguish between combatant and
noncombatant persons and objects.
The United States recognizes this rule. The Army, in its 2010
Law of War Deskbook, describes distinction as "the grandfather of
all principles," stating that the rule requires that "[p]arties to the
conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants and between civilian objects and
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations
only against military objectives."52
The Army's 2010 Operational Law Handbook defines
"indiscriminate" as
not directed against a military objective; employs a method
or means of delivery that cannot be directed at a specific
military objective; or may be expected to cause incidental
loss of civilian life or injury to civilian objects (including the
environment), which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage gained.53
The Operational Law Handbook also states, "Distinction
requires parties to a conflict to engage only in military operations
the effects of which distinguish between the civilian population
(or individual civilians not taking part in the hostilities), and
combatant forces, directing the application of force solely against
the latter." 54 It is explicit that the requirement of distinction
applies to the effects of the weapon being used. This becomes
52. ARMY, LAw OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 28, at 139.
53. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 350 n.81 (citing
Protocol II to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Excessively Injurious or Have Indiscriminate
Effects, art. 3, Oct. 10, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1523).
54. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).

2011]

NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IHL, AND THE NPT

615

important when considering the radiation effects of nuclear
weapons.
The Navy, in its Naval Commanders Handbook, states, "It is a
fundamental tenet of the law of armed conflict that the right of
nations engaged in armed conflict to choose methods or means
of warfare is not unlimited."5 5 Additionally, "weapons, which by
their nature are incapable of being directed specifically against
military

objectives,

and

therefore . . . put

civilians

and

noncombatants at equivalent risk, are forbidden due to their
indiscriminate effect."56 The handbook states further, "The
principle of distinction is concerned with distinguishing
combatants from civilians and military objects from civilian
objects so as to minimize damage to civilians and civilian
objects."57 Commanders have two duties under the principle of
distinction: they must "distinguish their forces from the civilian
population" and "distinguish valid military objectives from
civilians or civilian objects before attacking."58
Noting that the rule of distinction encompasses the effects
of the weapons being used, the Naval Commander's Handbook
highlights three types of attacks that the rule outlaws: (1) "attacks
that are not directed at a specific military objective"; (2) "attacks
that employ a method or means of combat that cannot be
directed at a specific military objective"; and (3) "attacks that
employ a method or means of combat, the effects of which cannot be
limited as requiredby the law of armed conflict."5 9
The Air Force, in its 2009 manual The Military Commander
and the Law, similarly states that the principle of distinction
"imposes a requirement to distinguish .. . between military
objectives and civilian objects.. .. An attacker must not
intentionally attack civilians or employ methods or means
(weapons or tactics) that would cause excessive collateral civilian

55. NAVAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28,

§ 9.1.

56. Id.
57. Id. § 5.3.2. Combatants are "persons engaged in hostilities during an armed
conflict." Id, § 5.4.1. Noncombatants "are those members of the armed forces who do
not take direct part in hostilities because of their status as medical personnel and
chaplains." Id. § 5.4.2. "A civilian is a person who is not a combatant or noncombatant."
Id. § 5.4.3.
58. Id. § 5.3.2.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
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casualties."60 The rule of distinction "prohibits 'indiscriminate
attacks.'" 61
2. Rule of Proportionality
The rule of proportionality prohibits the use of a weapon
whose potential collateral effects upon noncombatant persons or
objects would likely be disproportionate to the value of the
military advantage anticipated by the attack.
The United States recognizes this rule. The Air Force, in its
manual The Military Commanderand the Law, describes the rule of
proportionality as involving a balancing test in which "damages
and casualties must be consistent with mission accomplishment,"
and "civilian losses must be proportionate to the military
advantages sought." 62 The manual further states, "Those who
plan military operations must take into consideration the extent
of civilian destruction and probable casualties that will result and,
to the extent consistent with the necessities of the military
situation, seek to avoid or minimize such casualties and
destruction."63 The Air Force's 2009 manual Air Force Operations
and the Law states that the rule of proportionality "may be viewed
as a fulcrum for balancing military necessity and unnecessary
suffering." 64 Echoing the language in the Additional Protocol I to
the 1949 Geneva Convention, the Air Force, in its manual
Targeting, states that proportionality "requires [that] the
anticipated loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property
incidental to attack is not excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage expected from striking the
target."65
The Navy, in the Naval Commander's Handbook, states that a
commander is required "to conduct a balancing test to
determine if the incidental injury, including death to civilians
and damage to civilian objects, is excessive in relation to the

60. AIR FORCE, MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW, supra note 28, at 630.
61. AIR FORCE, TARGETING, supranote 28, at 90.
62. AIR FORCE, MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW, supranote 28, at 631.

63. Id.
64. AIR FORCE, OPERATIONS AND THE LAW, supra note 31, at 19.
65. AIR FORCE, TARGETING, supra note 31, at 89; see also ARMY, LAW OF WAR
DESKBOOK, supra note 31, at 140.
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66
concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained."
It further states that weapons that by their design cause
unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury are "prohibited
because the degree of pain or injury, or the certainty of death
they produce is needlessly or clearly disproportionate to the
military advantage to be gained by their use." 67
In an observation that is helpful in distinguishing the focus
of various interrelated principles, the Naval Commander's
Handbook states:
The principle of proportionality is directly linked to the
principle of distinction. While distinction is concerned with
focusing the scope and means of attack so as to cause the
least amount of damage to protected persons and property,
proportionality is concerned with weighing the military
advantage one expects to gain against the unavoidable and
incidental loss to civilians and civilian property that will
result from the attack.68
The United States, in its memorandum to the ICJ in the
Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, defined the proportionality
requirement in terms of the likely effects and associated risks:
Whether an attack with nuclear weapons would be
disproportionate depends entirely on the circumstances,
including the nature of the enemy threat, the importance of
destroying the objective, the character, size and likely effects
of the device, and the magnitude of the risk to civilians.
Nuclear weapons are not inherently disproportionate. 69

3. Rule of Necessity
The rule of necessity provides that a state may only use such
a level of force as is "necessary" or "imperatively necessary" to
achieve the military objective of the particular strike. Any
additional level of force is unlawful.

66. NAvAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28, § 5.3.3; see also JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. NO. 3-60, JOINT TARGETING E-1 (2007) [hereinafter JOINT CHIEFS,
JOINT TARGETING] ("The principle of proportionality requires that commanders weigh

the anticipated loss of civilian life and damage to civilian property reasonably expected
to result from military operations with the advantages expected to be gained.").
67. NAvAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supranote 28, § 9.1.1.
68. Id. § 5.3.3.

69. US ICJ Written Statement, supra note 44, at 23.
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The United States recognizes this rule. The Air Force, in its
2009 manual Air Force Operations and the Law, characterizes the
limitations of military necessity both as customary international
law and as ratified in the Hague Convention, which forbids a
belligerent "to destroy or seize the enemy's property unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war."7 0 Referencing the Hague Convention's
preamble, the manual states:
Military necessity does not authorize all acts in war that are
not expressly prohibited. Codification of the law of war into
specific prohibitions to anticipate every situation is neither
possible nor desirable. As a result, commanders and others
responsible for making decisions must make those decisions
in a manner consistent with the spirit and intent of the law of
war. 7 1
The manual further states:
The principle of avoiding the employment of arms,
projectiles, or material of a nature to cause unnecessary
suffering, also referred to as superfluous injury, is codified in
Article 23 of the Annex to Hague IV, which especially forbids
employment of "arms, projectiles or material calculated to
cause unnecessary suffering. . ." and the destruction or
seizure of "the enemy's property, unless such destruction or
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war."
Additional Protocol I, in article 35, states in paragraph 2:
"It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material
and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering."7 2
The manual emphasizes that the rule of necessity involves a
balancing test:
In determining whether a means or method of warfare
causes unnecessary suffering, a balancing test is applied
between lawful force dictated by military necessity to achieve
a military objective and the injury or damage that may be
70. AIR FORCE OPERATIONS AND THE LAW, supra note 28, at 14 (citing Convention
(IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning
the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(g), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277).
71. Id. at 14-15 (citing Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customer of
War,and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art.
23(g), supranote 70).
72. Id. at 15; see also ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 12.
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considered superfluous to achievement of the stated or
intended objective. Unnecessary suffering is used in an
objective rather than subjective sense. That is, the
measurement is not that of the victim affected by the means,
but rather in the sense of the design of a particular weapon
or in the employment of weapons.7 3
The Air Force, in International Law-The Conduct of Armed
Conflict and Air Operations ("Manual on International Law"),
discusses the importance of Hague IV and the Hague
Regulations by quoting the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg: "[B]y 1939, these rules laid down in the Convention
were recognized by all civilized nations, and were regarded as
being declaratory of the laws and customs of war." 74 The manual
further notes that "all of the major war criminals, including
Herman Goering, the Air Minister, were convicted, among other
crimes, of the devastation of towns not justified by military
necessity in violation of the law of war."75
The Army's Operational Law Handbook states that "l[t] he
principle of military necessity is explicitly codified in Article 23,
paragraph (g) of the Annex to Hague IV, which forbids a
belligerent 'to destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless such
destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war."' 76
The Naval Commander's Handbook states the law of war's
purpose "is to ensure that the violence of hostilities is directed
toward the enemy's war efforts and is not used to cause
unnecessary human misery and physical destruction."7 7 Even
though "[t]he principle of military necessity recognizes that
force resulting in death and destruction will have to be applied to
achieve military objectives,

...

its goal is to limit suffering and

destruction to that which is necessary to achieve a valid military
objective." 78
73. Id. at 15-16.
74. AIR FORCE, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 28, at 5-15 n.3
(quoting 22 Trial of German Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International
Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany 1, 496 (1946)). This manual is no
longer in effect. Its point about the Nuremberg Court's enforcement of the rule of
necessity remains compelling, however.
75. AIR FORCE, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL IAW, supranote 28, at 5-6.
76. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 10.
77. NAVAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28, § 5.3.1.
78. Id. § 5.3.1.
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To that end, the rule of necessity "prohibits the use of any
kind or degree of force not required for the partial or complete
submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of time,
life and physical resources." 79 The handbook further states:
While the principle does recognize that some amount of
collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians and
civilian objects may occur in an attack upon a legitimate
military objective, it does not excuse the wanton destruction
of life and property disproportionate to the military
advantage to be gained from the attack.80
The United States has also at times defined the necessity test
as based on whether the excessive effects were intentionally
designed into the weapon. The Naval Commander's Handbook
states that weapons that by their design cause unnecessary
suffering or superfluous injury are "prohibited because the
degree of pain or injury, or the certainty of death they produce is
needlessly or clearly disproportionate to the military advantage to
be gained by their use."8 1
In its presentation to the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons advisory
opinion, the United States similarly stated:
[The prohibition against unnecessary suffering] was
intended to preclude weapons designed to increase the
injury or suffering of the persons attacked beyond that
necessary to accomplish the military objective. It does not
prohibit weapons that may cause great injury or suffering if
the use of the weapon is necessary to accomplish the military
mission. For example, it does not prohibit the use of antitank munitions which must penetrate armor by kineticenergy or incendiary effects, even though this may well cause
severe and painful bum injuries to the tank crew. By the
same token, it does not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons,
79. Id.; see MYERS S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM

WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 525 (1961) ("A particular combat operation, comprising the
application of a certain amount of violence, can be appraised as necessary or
unnecessary only in relation to the attainment of a specified objective."); Statement of
General Dwight D. Eisenhower (Dec. 29, 1943), reprinted in RONALD SCHAFFER, WINGS
OFJUDGMENT: AMERICAN BOMBING IN WORLD WAR II 50-51 (1985) ("Nothing can stand
against the argument of military necessity.... But the phrase 'military necessity' is
sometimes used where it would be more truthful to speak of military convenience or
even of personal convenience.").
80. NAVAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28, § 6.2.6.4.2.
81. Id.§9.1.1.
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even though such weapons can produce severe and painful
injuries.8 2
John McNeill, one of the lawyers for the United States, made
essentially this same argument to the court: "The unnecessary
suffering principle prohibits the use of weapons designed
specifically to increase the suffering of persons attacked beyond
that necessary to accomplish a particular military objective." 83
4. Corollary Requirement of Controllability
The United States, in its military manuals and arguments to
the ICJ, has recognized that these rules of distinction,
proportionality, and necessity make it unlawful for a state to use
weapons whose effects it cannot control.
a.

Uncontrollability under the Rule of
Distinction/Discrimination

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their manual joint Targeting
state, "Attackers are required to only use those means and
methods of attack that are discriminate in effect and can be
controlled, as well as take precautions to minimize collateral
injury to civilians and protected objects or locations." 84 To
achieve this, "the principle of distinction (discrimination)
requires both attacker and defender to distinguish between
combatants and noncombatants, as well as between military
objectives and protected property, locations, or objects."85
The Air Force, in its manual The Military Commander and the
Law, gives "[w]eapons incapable of being controlled" as
examples of "indiscriminate weapons." 86
The Naval Commander's Handbook defines the rule of
distinction as prohibiting the use of a weapon "that cannot be
directed at a specific military objective" and whose effects
"cannot be limited as required by the law of armed conflict."8 7 It
states, "Weapons, which by their nature are incapable of being
82. US ICJ Written Statement, supra note 44, at 28 (citing ARMY LAW OF LAND
WARFARE, supra note 28, at 18).

83. ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 31, at 72.
84. JOINT CHIEFS,JOINT TARGETING, supra note 66, at E-2.
85. Id.
86. AIR FORCE, MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW, supra note 28, at 632.
87. NAVAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28, § 5.3.2.
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directed specifically against military objectives, and therefore that
put civilians and noncombatant at equal risk, are forbidden due
to their indiscriminate effects." 88 The handbook highlights three
types of attacks that are outlawed by the principle of
discrimination: (1) "attacks that are not directed at a specific
military objective"; (2) "attacks that employ a method or means
of combat that cannot be directed at a specific military
objective"; and (3) "attacks that employ a method or means of
combat, the effects of which cannot be limited as required by the
law of armed conflict."89
Moreover, the effects of the weapon must be capable of being
directed. The Naval Commander's Handbook states:
Weapons that are incapable of being directed at a
military objective are forbidden as being indiscriminate in
their effect. Drifting armed contact mines and long-range
unguided missiles (such as the German V-1 and V-2 rockets
of World War II) fall into this category. A weapon is not
indiscriminate simply because it may cause incidental or
collateral civilian casualties, provided such casualties are not
foreseeably excessive in light of the anticipated military
advantage to be gained. An artillery round that is capable of
being directed with a reasonable degree of accuracy at a
military target is not an indiscriminate weapon simply
because it may miss its mark or inflict collateral damage.
Conversely, uncontrolled balloon-borne bombs, such as
those released by the Japanese against the west coast of the
United States and Canada in World War II, lack that
capability of direction and are, therefore, unlawful. 9 0
The Army, in its Operational Law Handbook, sets forth a
similar rule, highlighting that effects of military operations that
cannot be controlled violate the rule of distinction: "Distinction
requires parties to a conflict to engage only in military operations
the effects of which distinguish between the civilian population
(or individual civilians not taking part in the hostilities), and
combatant forces, directing the application of force solely against
the latter."9 1

88. Id. § 9.1.
89. Id. § 5.3.2.
90. Id. § 9.1.2.
91. ARMY, OPERATIONAL

LAw HANDBOOK, supranote 28,

at 12 (emphasis added).
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The Air Force, in Air Force Operations and the Law, highlights
as an example of an indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons a
situation in which the attacking nation employs them to destroy a
satellite, noting that such use "would cause indiscriminate
damage to all satellites and would likely violate the law of armed
conflict principle of distinction."92 The Air Force's manual The
Military Commander and the Law similarly recognizes that
indiscriminate weapons include "biological and bacteriological
weapons," "weapons incapable of being controlled," and
"chemical weapons. "9

The requirement of controllability was codified with respect
to indiscriminate attacks in the 1977 Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions. Article 51 ("Protection of the Civilian Population")
reads:
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks
are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military
objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which
cannot be directed at a specific military objective;
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the
effects of which cannot be limited as required by the
Protocol;
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without
distinction.94
b.

Uncontrollability under the Rule of Proportionality

So also, a nuclear weapons strike cannot comply with the
requirement of proportionality if the potential effects are not
subject to control and limitation. Without such control, the user
cannot have a reasonable basis to believe that it can limit the
effects to those that are proportional to the military value of the
target.

92. AIR FORCE, OPERATIONS AND THE LAw, supra note 28, at 89.
93. AIR FORCE, MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW, supra note 28, at 632.
94. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), June
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 90.
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Uncontrollability under the Rule of Necessity

The Naval Commander's Handbook states that the rule of
necessity, in combination with the rule of distinction, prohibits
attacks that employ a method or means of combat that
cannot be directed at a specific military objective (e.g.,
declaring an entire city a single military objective and
attacking it by bombardment when there are actually several
distinct military objectives throughout the city that could be
targeted separately), or attacks that employ a method or
means of combat, the effects of which cannot be limited as
required by the law of armed conflict (e.g., bombing an
entire large city when the object of attack is a small enemy
garrison in the city).95
The Air Force, in its manual Air Force Operations and the Law,
states that military necessity acknowledges that attacks can only
be made against targets that are valid military objectives"attacks may not be indiscriminate." 96
5. Reprisals
May a state respond with an unlawful use of force to an
adversary's unlawful use of force? That is the question posed by
the notion of reprisals. The United States recognizes that, to be
lawful, reprisals must, at a minimum, be proportional to the prior
unlawful act and must be limited to that which is necessary to get
the adversary to comply with the law of armed conflict.
The Navy, in the Naval Commander's Handbook, defines
reprisals:
A belligerent reprisal is an enforcement measure under
the law of armed conflict consisting of an act that would
otherwise be unlawful but which is justified as a response to
the previous unlawful acts of an enemy. The sole purpose of
a reprisal is to induce the enemy to cease its illegal activity
and to comply with the law of armed conflict in the future.
Reprisals may be taken against enemy armed forces, enemy
civilians other than those in occupied territory, and enemy
property.9 7

95. NAVAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28, § 5.3.2
96. AIR FORCE, OPERATIONS AND THE LAW, supra note 28, at 248.
97. NAVAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28, § 6.2.4.
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The handbook emphasizes that a reprisal, inter alia, "must only
be used as a last resort when other enforcement measures have
failed or would be of no avail," "must be proportional to the
original violation," and "must be to cause the enemy to cease its
unlawful activity."9 8 Reprisals "must respond to illegal acts of
warfare," and "[a]nticipatory reprisal is not authorized."99
The Army, in its Law of War Deskbook, defines a reprisal "as
an otherwise illegal act done in response to a prior illegal act by
the enemy."100 The deskbook states that the "purpose of a
reprisal is to get the enemy to adhere to the law of war."10 ' To be
(2) be
authorized, reprisals must: (1) be "[t]imely";
"[r]esponsive to that enemy's act that violated the law of war";
(3) "[f] ollow an unsatisfied demand to cease and desist"; and (4)
be "[p]roportionate to the previous illegal act."1 0 2 The Army's
Operational Law Handbook states, "Reprisals are conduct which
otherwise would be unlawful, resorted to by one belligerent
against enemy personnel or property in response to acts of
warfare committed by the other belligerent in violation of the
[law of war], for the sole purpose of enforcing future compliance
with the [law of war]."103
Air Force Operations and the Law states, "Reprisals are not
intended to be a form of retaliation, but rather a means of
inducing an enemy to cease violating the law of armed
conflict." 104 In discussing the tu quoque defense, 05 the manual
analogizes it to the reprisal doctrine in that "this defense argues
that breaches of the law of armed conflict by the enemy
legitimize similar breaches by an opposing belligerent in
response to, or in retaliation for, such violations."10 6 Referencing
the Nazi's employment of this argument in the High Command
case, the manual states that this line of defense was rejected and
"that under general principles of law, an accused can not
98. Id. § 6.2.4.1.
99. Id.
100. ARMY, LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supranote 28, at 159.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 160.
103. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 24.
104. AIR FORCE, OPERATIONS AND THE LAW, supra note 28, at 44.

105. Id. at 59. "Latin for 'you, too,' this defense puts forth the argument that
breaches of the law of armed conflict by the enemy justify similar breaches by an
opposing belligerent." Id.
106. Id.
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exculpate himself from a crime by showing that another has
committed a similar crime" and cites Prosecutor v. Kuprestki for
the proposition that "there was no support either in State
practice or in the opinions of publicists for the tu quoque
defense." 0 7
The United States has generally recognized that the
doctrine of reprisals is a dangerous one subject to abuse and
likely to be counterproductive. Thus the United States, as a
matter of policy, is very cautious about reprisals and reluctant to
engage in them. The Air Force, in its former Manual on
InternationalLaw, states that "[m] ost attempted uses of reprisals"
in past conflicts were unjustified, either because they were
undertaken for an improper reason or were disproportionate.10 8
The manual notes that reprisal "will usually have an adverse
impact on the attitudes of governments not participating in the
conflict" and "may only strengthen enemy morale and will to
resist."109
The Navy, in an earlier edition of its Naval Commander's
Handbook, similarly states that "[m]any attempted uses of
reprisals in past conflicts have been unjustified either because the
reprisals were not undertaken to deter violations by an adversary
or were disproportionate to the preceding unlawful conduct."1 10
That same handbook further states, "Although reprisals are
lawful when [the stated prerequisites] are met, there is always the
risk that such reprisals will trigger counter-reprisals by the enemy.
The United States has historically been reluctant to resort to
reprisal forjust this reason.""'
The Air Force, in its former Commander's Handbook, similarly
stated, "In most twentieth century conflicts, the United States
has, as a matter of national policy, chosen not to carry out
reprisals against the enemy, both because of the potential for
escalation and because it is generally in our national interest to
follow the law even if the enemy does not."112 The handbook

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 59-60.
See AIR FORCE, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, supranote 28, at 10-5.
Id.
NAvAL COMMANDER's HANDBOOK 1989 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 28, at 6-25

n.46.
111. Id.
112. AIR FORCE, COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 8-1.
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stated that "as a practical matter, reprisals are often subject to
abuse and merely result in escalation of a conflict.""11
6. War Crimes
The Army's Law of Land Warfare defines "war crime" as "the
technical expression for a violation of the law of war by any
person or persons, military or civilian," and declares that
" [e]very violation of the law of war is a war crime."1 1 4 The manual
also states that war crimes under international law are made up
of (1) crimes against peace; (2) crimes against humanity; and (3)
war crimes.115
The Air Force's Air Force Operationsand the Law describes the
broad scope of war crimes:
A war crime is an act or omission that contravenes an
obligation under international law relating to the conduct of
armed conflict. The law of armed conflict encompasses all
international law applicable to the conduct of hostilities that
is binding on a country or its individual citizens, including
treaties and international agreements to which that country
is a party, as well as customary international law.1 16
It also quotes the Nuremberg Charter's definition of "war
crimes" (violations of the laws or customs of war):
Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder,
ill-treatment, or deportation to slave labor or for any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the
seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation notjustified by military necessity. 17
The Air Force manual notes the definition of "crimes
against the peace" set forth in the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg ("Nuremberg Charter") as
"planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,

113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
ARMY, LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, at 117.
Id,
AIR FORCE, OPERATIONS AND THE LAW, supra note 28, at 37.

117. 1& at 38.
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agreements, or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing."118
The manual further notes that the Nuremberg Charter's
definition of "crimes against humanity" is "[a] collective category
of major inhumane acts committed against any (internal or
alien) civilian population before or during the war."" 9 The
Nuremberg Charter defined "crimes against humanity" as
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial,
or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or
not in violation of the domestic law of the country where
perpetuated.o2 0
The Naval Commander's Handbook states that violations of the
laws of armed conflict are war crimes, and that "[s] tates are
obligated under international law to punish their own nationals,
whether members of the armed services or civilians, who commit
war crimes."1 2'
The Navy, in the 1997 edition of the Annotated Supplement to
the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, noting
that there is "certain difficulty in distinguishing war crimes from
crimes against humanity," summarized judgments of various
tribunals that have tried individuals for crimes against humanity
as follows:
1. Certain acts constitute both war crimes and crimes against
humanity and may be tried under either charge.
2. Generally, crimes against humanity are offenses against
the human rights of individuals, carried on in a widespread
and systematic manner. Thus, isolated offenses have not
been considered as crimes against humanity, and courts have
118. Id.
119. Id. The Rome Statute defines a "crime against humanity" as murder,
extermination, and other inhumane acts of a similar character, when committed as part
of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population. Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7,July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. This is
the modem version of the crime against humanity prosecuted at Nuremberg. Crimes
against humanity can be committed in time of peace and in time of war.
120. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
121. NAvAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28, § 6.2.6.
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usually insisted upon proof that the acts alleged to be crimes
against humanity resulted from systematic governmental
action.
3. The possible victims of crimes against humanity constitute
a wider class than those who are capable of being made the
objects of war crimes and may include the nationals of the
State committing the offense as well as stateless persons.
4. Acts constituting crimes against humanity must be
committed in execution of, or in connection with, crimes
against peace, or war crimes.12 2
7. Individual Responsibility for War Crimes
Both the state and the individuals associated with it,
including its governmental, military, and industrial leadership,
are potentially subject to criminal liability for the commission of
war crimes. As the Nuremberg proceedings exemplified,
individuals, not states, are potentially put in prison or
executed. 23 States can, and historically have been, subject to
damages and reparations, but, in contemporary international
law, the focus of war crimes trials is on the responsible
the
encompasses
responsibility
individuals.12 4 Individual
individual's own actions and a commander's responsibility for
the actions under the commander's command.
a.

Individual Responsibility for One's Own Actions

The United States recognizes the personal responsibility of
individual military personnel for violations of the law of armed
conflict-and that this responsibility extends to governmental
officials, including heads of state.
The Navy states in its Naval Commander's Handbook that "[a]ll
members of the naval service have a duty to comply with the law
of armed conflict and, to the utmost of their ability and
authority, to prevent violations by others. They also have an

122. NAVAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK 1997 SUPPLEMENT, supranote 28, at 6-22.
123. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES

150-71 (1963); Mark Allan Gray, The InternationalCrime of Ecocide, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
215, 265 (1996); Matthew Lippman, Crimes againstHumanity, 17 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
171, 171 (1997).
124. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 123, at 133-49; TELFORD TAYLOR,
NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 82-88 (1970).
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affirmative obligation to report promptly violations of which they
become aware."125
The Air Force, in Air Force Operations and the Law,
emphasizes the responsibility of government as well as military
personnel and the legal insufficiency of a defense of superior
orders to exculpate an individual from responsibility for
violations of international law:
Any person who commits an act which constitutes a
crime under international law is responsible for such crime
and may be punished. The fact that the law of the
perpetrator's country does not impose a penalty for an act
which constitutes a crime under international law does not
relieve the person who committed the act from responsibility
under international law. Moreover, the fact that a person
who committed an act which constitutes a crime under
international law acted as a Head of State or other
governmental official does not relieve him or her from
responsibility under international law. Finally, the fact that a
person acted pursuant to the order of his or her government
or of a superior does not relieve him or her from
responsibility for acts that violate international law.' 2 6
The Air Force's earlier Manual on InternationalLaw states
that mens rea, or a guilty mind, at the level of purposeful
behavior or intention or at least gross negligence, is required for
individual, as opposed to state, criminal responsibility.12 7 The
manual quotes Spaight's statement of the rule:
In international law as in municipal law intention to break
the law-mens rea-or negligence so gross as to be the
equivalent of criminal intent is the essence of the offence. A
bombing pilot cannot be arraigned for an error of
judgment.... [I]t must be one which he or his superiors
either knew to be wrong or which was, in se, so palpably and
unmistakably a wrongful act that only gross negligence or

125. NAVAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28, § 6.1.4.
126. AIR FORCE, OPERATIONS AND THE LAW, supra note 28, at 51.
127. AIR FORCE, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 28, at 15-2, 15-8 n.13
(citing J.M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND WAR RIGHTS 48 (1924)). This manual appears to
no longer be in effect. Although the more recent manuals do not appear to have
covered this issue of mens rea, the authors are not aware of any reason to believe that
the law in this area has changed.
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deliberate blindness could explain their being unaware of its
wrongfulness.128
The Army states in its Law of War Deskbook that "[i]t is a
grave breach of [Additional Protocol] I to launch an attack that a
commander knows will cause excessive incidental damage in
relation to the military advantage gained. The requirement is for
a commander to act reasonably."129
b. Command Responsibility
As for command liability, a commander is potentially
responsible for violations of the law of war by subordinates. The
Air Force manual Air Force Operations and the Law states, "Under
the doctrine of command responsibility, commanders may be
held liable for the criminal acts of their subordinates or other
persons subject to their control, even if the commander did not
personally participate in the underlying offenses."13 0
Command responsibility extends to information that the
commander should have known; the commander is responsible if
he "knew, had reason to know, or should have known, that a
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and
who failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof."1 3' This
has obvious implications with respect to contemporary
knowledge as to the effects of nuclear weapons.
The Air Force manual adds:
Responsibility may also arise if the commander has
actual knowledge, or should have known, on the basis of
reports received by him or through other means that troops
or persons subject to the commander's control are about to
commit or have committed a war crime, and he or she fails
to take the necessary and reasonable steps to ensure
compliance with the law of armed conflict or to punish
violators thereof. 132

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
ARMY, LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 28, at 140 (emphasis in original).
AIR FORCE, OPERATIONS AND THE LAW, supra note 28, at 52.
Id. at 52 n.177.
Id. at 53.
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The Naval Commander's Handbook emphasizes this same
demanding "should have known" standard, adding that a
commander
cannot delegate his accountability for the conduct of the
forces he commands. Under the law of armed conflict, a
commander may be held criminally responsible for ordering
the commission of a war crime [and] be held responsible for
the acts of subordinates when the commander knew, or
should have known, that subordinates under his control were
going to commit or had committed violations of the law of
armed conflict and he failed to exercise properly his
command authority or failed otherwise to take reasonable
measures to discover and correct violations that may
occur.133

The handbook explains that receipt of an unlawful order does
not immunize a commander from responsibility for a war crime:
"Under both international and U.S. law, an order to commit an
obviously criminal act, such as wanton killing or torture of a
prisoner, is an unlawful order and will not relieve a subordinate
of his responsibility to comply with the law of armed conflict." 3 4
This handbook states:
Only if the unlawfulness of an order is not known by the
individual, and he could not reasonably be expected under
the circumstances to recognize the order is unlawful, will the
defense of obedience to an order protect a subordinate from
the consequences of violating the law of armed conflict. 3 5
Additionally, the 1949 Geneva Conventions "place duties on
States to search for persons alleged to have committed grave
breaches, bring them to trial, and punish them if guilty."13 6 This
handbook notes that "[w]ar crimes trials numbered in the
thousands were held after World War II." 137
The Army recognizes a similar rule with regards to
subordinate liability. It states in its 2010 OperationalLaw Handbook
that

133. NAVAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28,

134. Id. § 6.1.4.
135. Id.
136. Id. § 6.2.6.
137. Id. § 6.2.6.1.

§ 6.1.3.
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[c]ommanders are legally responsible for war crimes
committed by their subordinates when any of three
circumstances applies:
a. The commander ordered the commission of the act;
b. The commander knew of the act, either before or during
its commission, and did nothing to prevent or stop it; or
c. The commander should have known, "through reports
received by him or through other means, that troops or
other persons subject to his control [were] about to commit
or [had] committed a war crime and he fail [ed] to take the
necessary and reasonable steps to insure compliance with the
LOW or to punish violators thereof." 38
The Air Force, in its earlier Manual on International Law,
notes that the prosecutions for crimes against peace and against
humanity following World War II were primarily "against the
principal political, military and industrial leaders responsible for
the initiation of the war and related inhumane policies." 3 9 The
manual states, "a soldier who merely performs his military duty
cannot be said to have waged the war.... [O]nly the government,
and those authorities who carry out governmental functions and
are instrumental in formulating policy, wage the war."140 Another
former Air Force Manual, Commander's Handbook, states that the
two international military tribunals following World War II
punished "former cabinet ministers, and others of similar rank"
in the Axis powers, for planning and waging aggressive war.14 '
G.

Purposesof InternationalHumanitarianLaw

The question invariably arises as to whether IHL is a serious
body of law that is more than merely aspirational and can be
expected to be observed. The numerous war crimes trials,
particularly the Nuremberg trials, which have entered into the
modern consciousness, would seem an adequate answer to this
question.

138. ARMY, OPERATIONAL IAW HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 35 (quoting ARMY,
LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, 1 501).
139. See AIR FORCE, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 28, at 15-5.
140. Id. at 15-9 n.23 (citing 11 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW, 993-94 (1963)) (emphasis in original).
141. AIR FORCE, COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 1-2.
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However, it is significant-and interesting-to note that the
United States, in its military manuals, broadly acknowledges the
propitious purposes of this body of law, both in terms of
enhancing a state's application of its combat operations without
unnecessary expenditures of force and in terms of fulfilling what
has long been regarded as a fundamental purpose of war:
restoring a favorable peace. The United States also recognizes
the basic humanitarian objective of this body of law designed to
protect one's own military personnel and objects and to limit the
effects of military operations.
Thus, the Army's OperationalLaw Handbookstates:
A. The fundamental purposes of the [law of war] are
humanitarian and functional in nature. The humanitarian
purposes include:
1. Protecting both combatants and noncombatants from
unnecessary suffering;
2. Safeguarding persons who fall into the hands of the
enemy; and
3. Facilitating the restoration of peace.
B. The functional purposes include:
1. Ensuring good order and discipline;
2. Fighting in a disciplined manner consistent with national
values; and
3. Maintaining domestic and international public support.14 2
The Air Force, in The Military Commander and the Law, notes
the following purposes of this body of law:
-Limit the effects of the conflict (reduce damages and
casualties)
-Protect combatants and noncombatants from unnecessary
suffering

-Safeguard
fundamental rights of combatants and
noncombatants
-Prevent the conflict from becoming worse
-Make it easier to restore peace when the conflict is over.143

142. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 10.
143. AIR FORcE, MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW, supra note 28, at 628.
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The Army's Law of War Deskbook emphasizes the serious
nature of this body of law, making it clear that it goes beyond the
aspirational:
Law exists to either prevent conduct or control conduct.
These characteristics permeate the law of war, as exemplified
by its two prongs: Jus ad Bellum serves to regulate the conduct
of going to war, while Jus in Bello serves to regulate or control
conduct within war.
Validity. Although critics of the regulation of warfare cite
historic examples of violations of evolving laws of war, history
provides the greatest evidence of the validity of this body of
law.
History shows that in the vast majority of instances, the
law of war works. Despite the fact that the rules are often
violated or ignored, it is clear that mankind is better off with
than without them. Mankind has always sought to limit the
effect of conflict on combatants and has come to regard war
not as a state of anarchy justifying infliction of unlimited
suffering, but as an unfortunate reality which must be
governed by some rule of law. This point is illustrated in
Article 22 of the Hague Regulations: "the right of
belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited." This rule does not lose its binding force in a case
of necessity.
Regulating the conduct of warfare is ironically essential
to the preservation of a civilized world. General MacArthur
exemplified this notion when he confirmed the death
sentence for Japanese General Yamashita, writing: "The
soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection of
the weak and unarmed. It is the very essence and reason of
his being. When he violates this sacred trust, he not only
profanes his entire cult but threatens the fabric of
international society. 1 "
The Navy, in its 1997 Annotated Supplement to the Commander's
Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, similarly emphasizes the
self-serving nature of this body of law to the United States and
other states in combat:
As long as war occurs, the law of armed conflict remains
an essential body of international law. During such strife, the
144. ARMY, LAw OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note

28, at 6.
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law of armed conflict provides common ground of rationality
between enemies. This body of law corresponds to the
mutual interests of belligerents during conflict and
constitutes a bridge for a new understanding after the end of
the conflict. The law of armed conflict is intended to
preclude purposeless, unnecessary destruction of life and
property and to ensure that violence is used only to defeat
the enemy's military forces. The law of armed conflict
inhibits warfare from needlessly affecting persons or things
of little military value. By preventing needless cruelty, the
bitterness and hatred arising from armed conflict is lessened,
and thus it is easier to restore an enduring peace. The legal
and military experts who attempted to codify the laws of war
more than a hundred years ago reflected this when they
declared that the final object of an armed conflict is the "reestablishment of good relations and a more solid and lasting
peace between the belligerent States."' 45
The Air Force, in its earlier Manual on InternationalLaw,
quotes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
The Armed Forces of the United States have benefited from,
and highly value, the humanitarianism encompassed by the
laws of war. Many are alive today only because of the mutual
restraint imposed by these rules, notwithstanding the fact
that the rules have been applied imperfectly.14 6
The severe limits implicit in these concepts as to the nature
of war and the purpose of the law of armed conflict were
portrayed most forcefully by the United States Military Tribunal
in the Krupp trial:
It is an essence of war that one or the other side must lose
and the experienced generals and statesmen knew this when
they drafted the rules and customs of land warfare. In short,
these rules and customs of warfare are designed specifically
for all phases of war. They comprise the law for such
emergency. To claim that they can be wantonly-and at the
sole discretion of any one belligerent-disregarded when he
considers his own situation to be critical, means nothing

145. NAvAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK 1997 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 28, at 5-3 n.5.
146. MOXLEY, supra note 13, at 769 (citing AIR FORCE, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 28, at 1-9. (quoting Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Address by
Gen. George S. Brown, News Release No. 479-74 (Oct. 1, 1974)).
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more or less than to abrogate the laws and customs of war
entirely. 47
H. Application of InternationalHumanitarianLaw to the Use of
Nuclear Weapons
What is the result of the application of these rules of IHL to
nuclear weapons? The ICJ, in its 1996 Nuclear Weapons advisory
opinion, provided a broad framework for the application of the
rules of IHL to nuclear weapons, but left certain questions open.
The court basically said that the use of nuclear weapons is subject
to IHL and would generally be unlawful under such law, but
found itself unable to decide whether the use of low-yield nuclear
weapons and the use of nuclear weapons in extreme
circumstances of self-defense could or could not potentially
comply with such law. The court did not decide such matters
either way, but rather concluded that it did not have sufficient
facts or law to decide them.
This Section will review the ICJ's treatment of these matters
and provide an analysis as to the application of IHL to the use of
nuclear weapons, including with reference to the issues the ICJ
did not reach: the lawfulness or not of the use of low-yield
nuclear weapons, and the use of nuclear weapons in extreme
circumstances of self-defense.
1. The ICJ's Application of IHL to Nuclear Weapons
The ICJ emphasized the wide scope of humanitarian law:
The cardinal principles contained in the texts
constituting the fabric of humanitarian law are the following.
The first is aimed at the protection of the civilian population
and civilian objects and establishes the distinction between
combatants and non-combatants; States must never make
civilians the object of attack and must consequently never
use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between
civilian and military targets. According to the second
principle, it is prohibited to cause unnecessary suffering to
combatants: it is accordingly prohibited to use weapons
causing them such harm or uselessly aggravating their
suffering. In application of that second principle, States do
147. NAvAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK 1989 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 28, at 5-6
(quoting The Krupp Trial, 10 L. REP. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 69, 139 (1949)).
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not have unlimited freedom of choice of means in the
weapons they use.
The Court would likewise refer, in relation to these
principles, to the Martens Clause, which was first included in
the Hague Convention II with Respect to the Laws and
Customs of War on Land of 1899 and which has proved to be
an effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of
military technology. A modem version of that clause is to be
found in Article 1, paragraph 2, of Additional Protocol I of
1977, which reads as follows:
In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other
international agreements, civilians and combatants
remain under the protection and authority of the
principles of international law derived from established
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the
dictates of public conscience.
In conformity with the aforementioned principles,
humanitarian law, at a very early stage, prohibited certain
types of weapons either because of their indiscriminate effect
on combatants and civilians or because of the unnecessary
suffering caused to combatants, that is to say, a harm greater
than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military
objectives. If an envisaged use of weapons would not meet
the requirements of humanitarian law, a threat to engage in
such use would also be contrary to that law.148
The ICJ went on to find the use of nuclear weapons
"scarcely reconcilable" with IHL:
[T]he principles and rules of law applicable in armed
conflict-at the heart of which is the overriding
consideration of humanity-make the conduct of armed
hostilities subject to a number of strict requirements. Thus,
methods and means of warfare, which would preclude any
distinction between civilian and military targets, or which
would result in unnecessary suffering to combatants, are
prohibited. In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear
weapons, to which the Court has referred above, the use of
such weapons in fact seems scarcely reconcilable with respect
for such requirements.149

148. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996

I.C.J. 226, 1 78 (July 8).
149. Id.

95.

2011]

NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IHL, AND THE NPT

639

The ICJ further stated:
A threat or use of nuclear weapons should .. . be
compatible with the requirements of the international law
applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the
principles and rules of international humanitarian law, as
well as with specific obligations under treaties and other
undertakings which expressly deal with nuclear weapons.1 50
The court concluded that the threat or use of nuclear
weapons
would generally be contrary to the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles
and rules of humanitarian law;
However in view of the current state of international
law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court
cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of
nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme
circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a
State would be at stake.' 5 1
Referring to the contrasting contentions presented, the
court concluded that it did not have the necessary facts to
determine the likely effects of the limited use of low-yield nuclear
weapons or of escalation. It first addressed the contentions of the
United Kingdom:
The reality . . . is that nuclear weapons might be used in a

wide variety of circumstances with very different results in
terms of likely civilian casualties. In some cases, such as the
use of a low yield nuclear weapon against warships on the
High Seas or troops in sparsely populated areas, it is possible
to envisage a nuclear attack which caused comparatively few
civilian casualties. It is by no means the case that every use of
nuclear weapons against a military objective would inevitably
cause very great collateral civilian casualties.152
The court then summarized the diametrically opposite
contentions of certain other states:
[R]ecourse to nuclear weapons could never be compatible
with the principles and rules of humanitarian law and is
150. Id. 1105 (2)D.
151. Id. 1105 (2)E; see also id. 197.
152. Id. 1 91 (quoting Written Statement of the Government of the United
Kingdom, supra note 31, 13.70).
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therefore prohibited. In the event of their use, nuclear
weapons would in all circumstances be unable to draw any
distinction between the civilian population and combatants,
or between civilian objects and military objectives, and their
effects, largely uncontrollable, could not be restricted, either
in time or in space, to lawful military targets. Such weapons
would kill and destroy in a necessarily indiscriminate
manner, on account of the blast, heat and radiation
occasioned by the nuclear explosion and the effects induced;
and the number of casualties which would ensue would be
enormous. The use of nuclear weapons would therefore be
prohibited in any circumstance, notwithstanding the absence
of any explicit conventional prohibition.'5 3
While finding itself unable to resolve these competing
factual contentions, the court did conclude that the proponents
of the lawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons had failed to
substantiate their position as to the possibility of limited use,
without escalation, of low-yield nuclear weapons or even of the
potential utility of such use if it were possible:
[N]one of the States advocating the legality of the use of
nuclear weapons under certain circumstances, including the
"clean" use of smaller, low yield, tactical nuclear weapons,
has indicated what, supposing such limited use were feasible,
would be the precise circumstances justifying such use; nor
whether such limited use would not tend to escalate into the
all-out use of high yield nuclear weapons. This being so, the
Court does not consider that it has a sufficient basis for a
determination of the validity of this view.154
The court noted at the outset of its opinion that, ostensibly
based on the advisory nature of its task, it did not intend to
descend into the minute details of the facts:
The Court does not consider that, in giving an advisory
opinion in the present case, it would necessarily have to write
"scenarios", to study various types of nuclear weapons and to
evaluate highly complex and controversial technological,
strategic and scientific information. The Court will simply
address the issues arising in all their aspects by applying the
legal rules relevant to the situation.15 5
153. Id. 92.
154. Id. 94.
155. Id. 1 15.
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Similarly, in discussing proportionality, the court stated that
it did "not find it necessary to embark upon the quantification"
of risk factors surrounding the use of nuclear weapons and did
not "need to enquire into the question whether tactical nuclear
weapons exist which are sufficiently precise to limit those
risks."156

As to the limits on a state's right of self-defense, the court,
after noting that a state's exercise of the right of self-defense
must comply, inter alia, with the principle of proportionality,
specifically stated that a "use of force that is proportionate under
the law of self-defence, must, in order to be lawful, also meet the
requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict which
comprise in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian

law."

157

The court also quoted the statement on this point by the
United Kingdom, a proponent of the potential lawfulness of the
use of nuclear weapons: "Assuming that a State's use of nuclear
weapons meets the requirements of self-defence, it must then be
considered whether it conforms to the fundamental principles of
the law of armed conflict regulating the conduct of hostilities."15 8
The court further emphasized in the final paragraph of its
decision that the various grounds set forth in the 'decision were
to be read in the light of one another.1 59
The court also noted that under the UN Charter, the threat
or use of force is prohibited except in individual or collective selfdefense in response to armed attack or in instances of military
enforcement measures undertaken by the Security Council,'o
and stated that under customary international law the right of
self-defense is subject to the conditions of necessity and
156. Id. 43.
157. Id. 42.
91 (quoting Written Statement of the Government of the United
158. Id.
Kingdom, supra note 31, 3.44).
159. The court stated
that its reply to the question put to it by the General Assembly rests on the
totality of the legal grounds set forth by the Court above (paragraphs 20 to
103), each of which is to be read in the light of the others. Some of these
grounds are not such as to form the object of formal conclusions in the final
paragraph of the Opinion; they nevertheless retain, in the view of the Court,
all of their importance.
Id. 104.
160. See id. 1 38 (citing U.N. Charter art. 51).
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proportionality. The court quoted its decision in Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua: "[T] here is a
'specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only measures
which are proportional to the armed attack and necessary to
respond to it, a rule well established in customary international
law." 161
2.

The Unlawfulness of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

As noted, the ICJ found the threat and use of nuclear
weapons generally unlawful under IHL, but did not reach the
question of such threat and use in extreme circumstances of selfdefense and where "low-yield" nuclear weapons are concerned.
This Section addresses those questions left open by the court.
Applying the foregoing legal requirements of IHL to the
known facts regarding nuclear weapons, including such facts as
stated by various judges of the ICJ, it seems evident that nuclear
weapons cannot be used consistently with IHL.
Most centrally, the effects of nuclear weapons, including
radiation, are inherently uncontrollable. They are not subject to
the control of the state using them or of any force on earth. Even
the blast, heat, and electromagnetic impulse effects of nuclear
weapons are beyond human control. As the ICJ observed, "The
destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in
either space or time." 62 Because their effects are uncontrollable,
nuclear weapons cannot be used in such a way as to limit their
effects to those permitted under the rules of distinction,
proportionality, and necessity. Under the statements of the law by
the United States' own military, this makes the use of these
weapons unlawful.
Even the effects of so-called mini-nukes, 6 3 are spread
unpredictably and potentially at great distances in space and
161. Id. 41 (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 176 (June 27)).
162. Id. 1 35.
163. While there is no definitive definition of a low-yield nuclear weapon or of a
mini-nuke, it is notable that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their earlier manual DOCTRINE
FORJOINT THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, define the various levels of nuclear weapons:

very low (less than 1 kiloton); low (1 to 10 kilotons); medium (10 to 50 kilotons); high
(50 to 500 kilotons); and very high (over 500 kilotons). JOINT THEATER NUCLEAR

OPERATIONS, supra note 28, at GL-3. This manual, however, does not seem to still be in
effect The current manuals do not appear to cover this point. The authors are not
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aware of any reason these definitions would change. As a frame of reference, the nuclear
weapons exploded in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were approximately fifteen and twentyone kilotons respectively. JOHN MALIK, Los ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY, REPORT
LA-8819, THE YIELDS OF THE HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS 1 (1985).

When the US Congress in 1994 banned research and development of low-yield nuclear
weapons, it defined such weapons as ones with yields of less than five kilotons-tactical
weapons with virtually no strategic value. See National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 3136, repealed by National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136.
Describing the rationale for the legislation, Congressman Spratt stated, "The
United States has wisely decided to retire our tactical nuclear weapons." 139 Cong. Rec.
H7083, (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1993) (statement of Rep. Spratt). The Congressman further
stated, "A 5-kiloton yield nuclear weapon is a very small nuclear weapon that is surely
tactical; it has virtually no strategic value." Id.
The statute defining low-yield nuclear weapons, as indicated above, has been
repealed (albeit for reasons unrelated to the definition of low-yield nuclear weapons).
To the best of the authors' knowledge, no alternate definition of a low-yield nuclear
weapon has been enacted by the Congress.
Based on this definition of five kilotons or less, the United States currently has two
types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons with low-yield capabilities. See Robert S. Norris &
Hans M. Kristensen, Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Forces 2010, BULL. OF ATOMIC

SCIENTISTS, May/June 2010, at 57, 58. One of these weapons is the sea-launched, landattack Tomahawk (TLAM/N) cruise missile equipped with W80-0 warheads, of which
the United States has 100. See id. The other is the non-strategic B61 gravity bomb, of
which the United States has 400. See id. In addition, the United States has several
strategic bombers that could be used to deliver low-yield weapons. See id.
During the Bush Administration, the United States sought to expand the role of
these low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, NUCLEAR POSTURE

REVIEW (2002), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Jan2002/d20020109npr.pdf.
The Obama Administration, however, has reversed this trend as the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review "recommends that the nuclear version of the TI.AM be retired.
Designed for deployment on select attack submarines, the TLAM/N is now stored at the
SSBN bases in Washington and Georgia." Norris & Kristensen, supra.
Low-yield nuclear weapons have uncertain effects and remain extremely
destructive. For example,
detonating a low-yield nuclear weapon in or even near a city could cause much
collateral damage. By one estimate, a 5-kiloton weapon detonated near and
upwind from Damascus, Syria, at a depth of 30 feet would cause 230,000
fatalities and another 280,000 casualties within two years. Use of a low yield
earth penetrator against the bunkers thought to house Saddam Hussein in
Baghdad, a city of nearly 5 million people, could have caused casualties on a
similar scale.
JONATHAN MEDALIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32130, NUCLEAR WEAPON INITIATIVES:
LOW-YIELD R&D, ADVANCED CONCEPTS, EARTH PENETRATORS, TEST READINESS 22-23

(2004) (citing 149 Cong. Rec. S6666 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy)).
Further, regardless of its size, the use of a low-yield nuclear weapon crosses the
nuclear threshold, and
[t]he State at the receiving end of such a nuclear response would not know
that the response is a limited or tactical one involving a small weapon and it is
not credible to posit that it will also be careful to respond in kind, that is, with
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time. In addition, the use of nuclear weapons by a state would
not likely be in a vacuum, but rather would carry the risk of
leading to nuclear counterstrikes and escalation, thereby
increasing the effects of their use.
By definition, a weapon whose effects cannot be controlled
is indiscriminate and violates the rule of distinction, the
"grandfather of all principles." 1 5 Such a weapon is also unable to
satisfy the requirement of proportionality, which mandates that a
state using a weapon be able to control its effects.'16 If the state
cannot control such effects, it cannot ensure that the collateral
effects of the attack will be proportional to the anticipated
military advantage.
A weapon whose effects cannot be limited similarly cannot
satisfy the requirement of necessity. If a state cannot control the
effects of a weapon, it cannot ensure that the level of force it
would be using with that weapon would be limited to that
necessary to achieve the particular military objective.
Accordingly, the inherent uncontrollability of nuclear
weapons, even low-yield nuclear weapons, renders them unlawful
under IHL. This seems to be the end of the matter. The
application of the established principles of international law to
the essentially incontrovertible effects of nuclear weapons
renders the use of such weapons unlawful.
The United States, as understood by the authors, has
interposed essentially ten arguments for why some uses of
nuclear weapons could be lawful under international law:
1. Controllability:The United States argues that the effects of
some nuclear weapons are controllable.
2. Radiation as an inherent effect of nuclear weapons- The
United States argues that the radiation effects of nuclear
weapons does not violate the rule of necessity because radiation
is an inherent effect of nuclear weapons, not an effect added to
cause extra injury to its victims.

a small weapon. The door would be opened and the threshold crossed for an
all-out nuclear war.
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J 226, 325
(July 8) (WeeramantryJ. dissenting).
164. See supra notes 52-61, 84-94 and accompanying text; see also ARMY, LAW OF
WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 28, at 139.

165. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
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3. Radiation as a secondary byproduct of nuclear weapons- The
United States argues that radiation does not matter as a nuclear
weapons effect because it is not an intended effect of nuclear
weapons, but rather merely a byproduct.
4. Use of low-yield nuclear weapons in remote areas-The United
States argues that it cannot be said that nuclear weapons
necessarily have impermissible effects under international law
because some such weapons could be used selectively in remote
areas where the collateral effects would be minor.
5. Use of nuclear weapons in reprisalfor another state's unlawful
use of such weapons- The United States argues that, even if it would
be unlawful to use nuclear weapons in the first instance, a state
could properly use them in reprisal to respond to another state's
use of such weapons.
6. Need for evaluation of the use of nuclear weapons on a case-bycase basis- The United States argues that no categorical judgments
can be made as to the lawfulness or not of the use of nuclear
weapons, but rather that each potential use has to be evaluated
on its individual merits.
7. No prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons unless the United
States agrees to such a prohibition: The United States argues that,
because international law is of a voluntary nature, there can be
no prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons unless the United
States (or, presumably, every other nuclear state) agrees
explicitly to such a prohibition.
8. Lawfulness of the threat of use of all nuclear weapons in the
United States arsenalif the use of any nuclear weapon in that arsenal is
lawful: The United States impliedly argues that its policy of
deterrence with respect to its entire arsenal of nuclear weapons is
lawful as long as the use of any weapon in that arsenal could
potentially be lawful.
9. The characterization that the ICJ found the use of nuclear
weapons to be lawful: The United States at times characterizes the
ICJ decision in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion as
upholding the lawfulness of the use and threat of use of nuclear
weapons; and
10. The implicit argument that nuclear weapons may be used in
extreme circumstances of self-defense- The United States seems
implicitly to have adopted the position that nuclear weapons
could lawfully be used in extreme circumstances of self-defense.
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To the best of the authors' knowledge, these arguments
represent the totality of the bases upon which the United States
has explicitly or even implicitly justified the potential use of
nuclear weapons under international law. Based on the authors'
analysis, these purported bases of legality are unfounded and are
next evaluated one by one.
a. Controllability
The United States, in its defense before the ICJ of the
potential lawfulness of some uses of nuclear weapons, did not
contest the requirement of controllability under international
law. Its defense, instead, was that the effects of some nuclear
weapons, particularly low-yield nuclear weapons, are controllable
and that, therefore, such weapons may lawfully be used. The
United States made no defense before the ICJ of the lawfulness
of the use of higher-yield nuclear weapons, the type that typifies
its nuclear arsenal.1 66 It did not even defend the lawfulness of the
use of multiple low-yield weapons or of low-yield nuclear weapons
in populated areas. Its defense was, in fact, exceedingly narrow,
limited to the defense of a small portion of its nuclear arsenal. 6
John H. McNeill, the US Senior Deputy General Counsel,
Department of Defense, argued the US position to the ICJ:
The argument that international law prohibits, in all
cases, the use of nuclear weapons appears to be premised on
the incorrect assumption that every use of every type of
nuclear weapon will necessarily share certain characteristics
which contravene the law of armed conflict. Specifically, it
appears to be assumed that any use of nuclear weapons
would inevitably escalate into a massive strategic nuclear
exchange, resulting automatically in the deliberate
destruction of the population centers of opposing sides.
Nuclear weapons, as is true of conventional weapons, can be
used in a variety of ways: they can be deployed to achieve a
wide range of military objectives of varying degrees of
significance; they can be targeted in ways that either increase
or decrease resulting incidental civilian injury or collateral
damage; and their use may be lawful or not depending upon
166. See ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 31, at 68-71.
167 See id.

2011]

NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IHL, AND THE NPT

647

whether and to what extent such use was prompted by
another belligerent's conduct and the nature of such
conduct.168

McNeill disputed the argument that nuclear weapons are
indiscriminate in their effects: "This argument is simply contrary
to fact. Modern nuclear weapon delivery systems are, indeed,
capable of precisely engaging discrete military objectives."' 6 9
McNeill further disputed the assumptions made by the
World Health Organization ("WHO") in its 1987 study on the
effects of nuclear weapons. He argued to the ICJ that the "four
scenarios" depicted by the WHO were "highly selective" in that
they addressed "civilian casualties expected to result from
nuclear attacks involving significant numbers of large urban area
targets or a substantial number of military targets."17 0 Reflecting
what he contended to be potentially lawful uses of nuclear
weapons, he stated, "But no reference is made in the report to
the effects to be expected from other plausible scenarios, such as
a small number of accurate attacks by low-yield weapons against
an equally small number of military targets in non-urban
areas."17 1
Referring to "other plausible [low-end use] scenarios,"
McNeill argued that such plausibility "follows from a fact noted
in the WHO Report by Professor Rotblat, namely, that
'remarkable improvements' in the performance of nuclear
weapons in recent years have resulted in their 'much greater
accuracy,"' 72 and that such scenarios "would not necessarily raise
issues of proportionality or discrimination." 178
Addressing the subject of the many studies indicating that
impermissible levels of damage would result from the use of
nuclear weapons, McNeill objected that any given study "rests on
static assumptions" as to factors such as "the yield of a weapon,
the technology that occasions how much radiation the weapon
may release, where, in relation to the earth's surface it will be

168. Id. at 68-69.
169. Id. at 70.
170. Id. at 71.
171. Id.
172. Id. (quoting WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR ON
HEALTH AND HEALTH SERVICES (2d ed. 1987)).
173. Id.
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detonated, and the military objective at which it would be
targeted."174
In its memorandum to the ICJ, the United States similarly
argued that, through the technological expertise of "modern
weapon designers," it is now able to control the effects of nuclear
weapons-specifically, "to tailor the effects of a nuclear weapon
to deal with various types of military objectives":
It has been argued that nuclear weapons are unlawful
because they cannot be directed at a military objective. This
argument ignores the ability of modem delivery systems to
target specific military objectives with nuclear weapons, and
the ability of modem weapon designers to tailor the effects
of a nuclear weapon to deal with various types of military
objectives. Since nuclear weapons can be directed at a
military objective, they can be used in a discriminate manner
and are not inherently indiscriminate.175
Beyond arguing that the effects of any particular use of a
nuclear would depend on the particular circumstances, the
United States minimized the differences between the effects of
nuclear and conventional weapons. McNeill stated to the court:
It is true that the use of nuclear weapons would have an
adverse collateral effect on human health and both the
natural and physical environment. But so too can the use of
conventional weapons. Obviously, World Wars I and II, as
well as the 1990-1991 conflict resulting from Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait, dramatically demonstrated that conventional war
can inflict terrible collateral damage to the environment.
The fact is that armed conflict of any kind can cause
widespread, sustained destruction; the Court need not
examine scientific evidence to take judicial notice of this
evident truth.176
These arguments by the United States asserting the
controllability of the effects of low-yield nuclear weapons and
generally minimizing the effects of nuclear weapons do not
withstand analysis. These were merely assertions. The United
States presented no evidence to the court that it could control
the effects of its nuclear weapons or limit their effects to those
174. Id.
175. US ICJ Written Statement, supra note 44, at 23.
176. ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 31, at 70-71.
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permissible within the rules of distinction, proportionality, or
necessity.1 77 For the reasons discussed above, it does not seem
possible that the United States could satisfy these legal
requirements. The radiation and other effects of nuclear
weapons simply are not subject to such control or limitation. To
the best of the authors' knowledge, neither the United States nor
any other nuclear weapons state is able to exert such control or
impose the limits of law on the effects of nuclear weapons.
In short, based on the statements of the requirement of
controllability by the United States,178 the uncontrollability of the
effects of nuclear weapons means that the use of such weapons
would be unlawful under the rules of distinction, proportionality,
and necessity.179 Based on the statement of the rule of distinction
by the United States, 180 the use of nuclear weapons cannot
comport with the rule of distinction because the effects of
nuclear weapons cannot discriminate between belligerent and
non-belligerent persons and objects. Based on the statements of
the rules of proportionality'8 1 and necessity18 2 by the United
States, a state using nuclear weapons could not assure that the
effects would be limited to those permitted by those rules.
In addition, the rule of necessity requires that the strike
appear likely to yield a concrete military benefit.18 3 A strike that is
likely to boomerang due to escalation or dispersion of radioactive
particles, in a net detriment to the acting state, would not satisfy
the necessity test.
Notwithstanding the United States' arguments to the court,
the US military has itself recognized the uncontrollability of the
effects of nuclear weapons. A publication prepared under the
direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressed
the controllability question explicitly: "[T]here can be no
assurances that a conflict involving weapons of mass destruction
could be controllable or would be of short duration. Nor are
177. See supra notes 52-96 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 88-101 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 88-101 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
182. See supra Part I.F.c.
183. See, e.g., AIR FORCE, TARGETING, supranote 28, at 89; ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 350 n.81; see also ARMY, LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note
28, at 142.
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negotiations opportunities and the capacity for enduring control
over military forces clear."1 84
As referenced above in the statement by Judge
Shahabuddeen in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, 185 the
United States, by ratifying the Treaty of Tlatelolco, subscribed to
the statement that the "terrible effects" of nuclear weapons "are
suffered, indiscriminately and inexorably, by military forces and
civilian population alike," and "through the persistence of the
radioactivity they release, an attack on the integrity of the human
species and ultimately may even render the whole earth
uninhabitable." 186
The Army, in its manual Nuclear Operations,emphasizes the
inherent unpredictability of the effects of nuclear weapons and
of the risk of escalation: "The potential employment of nuclear
weapons at theater level, when combined with the means and
resolve to use them, makes the prospects of conflict more
dangerous and the outcome more difficult to predict."' 8 7
The US Joint Chief of Staffs prior Joint Nuclear Operations
manual recognizes that "the use of nuclear weapons represents a
significant escalation from conventional warfare," a factor that
highlights the uncontrollability of nuclear weapons effects.' 88 The
manual states, "The fundamental differences between a potential
nuclear war and previous military conflicts involve the speed,
scope, and degree of destruction inherent in nuclear weapons
employment, as well as the uncertainty of negotiating
opportunities and enduring control over military forces."189 It
goes on to say, "The immediate and prolonged effects of
[weapons of mass destruction]-including blast, thermal
radiation, prompt (gamma and neutron) and residual
radiation-pose unprecedented physical and psychological
problems for combat forces and noncombatant populations

184. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. No. 3-12, DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR
OPERATIONS 1-6-1-7 (1995).
185. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
186. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supranote 25, at 328 (quoted in Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 384 (July 8)
(Shahabuddeen,J., dissenting)).
187. U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, MANUAL No. FM100-30, NUCLEAR OPERATIONS 3-14

(1996).
188. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 184, at 11-1.
189. Id. at 1-6 (emphasis omitted).
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alike."o9 0 The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in Joint Theater Nuclear
Operations, also notes, "Since nuclear weapons have greater
destructive potential, in many instances they may be
inappropriate."1 9 1
Thus, it seems evident that the effects of nuclear weapons,
including the radiation effects, are uncontrollable and have been
recognized as such by responsible representatives of the US
military and government. On this basis alone, the use of nuclear
weapons, even relatively low-yield nuclear weapons, is precluded
by IHL.
b. Radiation as an Inherent Effect of Nuclear Weapons
The United States' second argument in support of the
lawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons is that, because
radiation is an inherent effect of nuclear weapons, not an effect
added to cause extra injury to its victims, the radiation effects of
nuclear weapons do not cause nuclear weapons to violate the
rule of necessity. The United States articulated this position in its
argument to the ICJ: that the rule of necessity only precludes
"weapons designed to increase the injury or suffering of the
persons attacked beyond that necessary to accomplish the
military objective"' 9 2 or "weapons designed specifically to
increase the suffering of persons attacked beyond that necessary
to accomplish a particular military objective." 9 3
This restriction on the scope of the requirement of necessity
seems inconsistent with the traditional formulation of this rule as
precluding all levels of destruction not necessary under the
circumstances. 194 Such a gloss would emasculate the rule and
provide for a virtually limitless range of unnecessary uses of
weapons. It certainly is the case that the addition of an element
to the design of a weapon to cause necessary injury (such as
adding glass to a bullet or designing the bullet to fracture when it
enters the body) would cause the use of the weapon to violate the
rule of necessity, but there does not appear to be any basis for
190. Id., at 11-7.
191. JOINT THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 28, at v-vi.
192. US ICJ Written Statement, supra note 44, at 28-29 (citing ARMY, LAW OF LAND
WARFARE, supranote 28, at 18, 1 34).
193. ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 31, at 72.
194. See supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text.
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the assertion that the effect of the weapon causing the
unnecessary injury does not count in the legal analysis unless it
was intentionally built into the weapon.
The only source the United States cited in its brief to the ICJ
in support of this limitation was a US Army field manual,195 which
notes regarding the employment of arms causing unnecessary
injury that
[i]t is especially forbidden ... to employ arms, projectiles, or

material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.
Interpretation.What weapons cause "unnecessary injury" can
only be determined in light of the practice of States in
refraining from the use of a given weapon because it is
believed to have that effect. The prohibition certainly does
not extend to the use of explosives contained in artillery
projectiles, mines, rockets, or hand grenades. Usage has,
however, established the illegality of the use of lances with
barbed heads, irregular-shaped bullets, and projectiles filled
with glass, the use of any substance on bullets that would
tend unnecessarily to inflame a wound inflicted by them, and
the scoring of the surface or the filing off of the ends of the
hard cases of bullets.19 6
The Navy, in its earlier Annotated Supplement to the Naval
Commander's Handbook, similarly suggested this limitation on the
rule of necessity:
Customary international law prohibits the use of weapons
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering; the rule is
declared in the Hague Regulations, article 23(e), and now
confirmed in Additional Protocol I, article 35(2), which
prohibits the employment of weapons, projectiles and
materials and methods of warfare of a nature such as would
cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. However,
these humanitarian considerations are offset by a due regard
for the military interests at stake. The Declaration of St.
Petersburg 1868 ... contrasts the two: on the one hand, the

only legitimate object during a war is to weaken the military
forces of the enemy. On the other, this object would be
exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their
death inevitable. Nuclear weapons can be selectively directed
ICJ Written Statement, supra note 44, at 22.
196. ARMY, LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supranote 28, at 18 (citation omitted).

195. See US
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against military targets. In the context of this balance, it is
not clear the use of nuclear weapons necessarily violates
international law. 197
However, the actual formulation of this rule in the
referenced Hague Regulations Article 23(e) and Additional
Protocol 1 Article 35(2) does not contain this gloss on the rule.
Article 23(e) of the Hague Regulations makes it unlawful "[t]o
employ arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause
superfluous injury." 98 Article 35(2) of Additional Protocol I
provides, "It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering."19 9 In each instance, the
reference is to the "nature" of the weapon or method of warfare,
not to whether the objectionable effects of the weapons or
method were intentionally designed for or added-or even
whether those effects were the result of separate "calculation."
Accordingly, the United States' gloss on the rule of necessity
postulating that, to be unlawful, the excessive effects must have
been specifically sought in designing a weapons seems
unsupported by the language of the rule and contrary to its
purpose. Surely, whether the putatively unnecessary effects were
intentionally added or are an inherent characteristic of the
weapon or method of warfare is irrelevant to the objective of
avoiding unnecessary effects.
Judge Weeramantry's dissent in the Nuclear Weapons case
discussed at length the contention of the United States and other
nuclear weapons states that they are able to use low-yield nuclear
weapons in a way that keeps their effects within legal limits:
Reference has already been made to the contention, by
those asserting legality of use, that the inherent dangers of
nuclear weapons can be minimized by resort to "small" or
"clean" or "low yield" or "tactical" nuclear weapons. This
factor has an important bearing upon the legal question
before the Court, and it is necessary therefore to examine in
197. NAVAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK 1989 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 28, at 10-2.
198. Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(e), July

29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803.
199. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art.
35(2),June 8, 1977,1125 U.N.T.S. 21.
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some detail the acceptability of the contention that limited
weapons remove the objections based upon the
destructiveness of nuclear weapons.
The following are some factors to be taken into account
in considering this question:
(i) no material has been placed before the Court
demonstrating that there is in existence a nuclear weapon
which does not emit radiation, does not have a deleterious
effect upon the environment, and does not have adverse
health effects upon this and succeeding generations. If there
were indeed a weapon which does not have any of the
singular qualities outlined earlier in this Opinion, it has not
been explained why a conventional weapon would not be
adequate for the purpose for which such a weapon is used.
We can only deal with nuclear weapons as we know them.
(ii) the practicality of small nuclear weapons has been
contested by high military and scientific authority.
(iii) reference has been made . .

. ,

in the context of self-

defence, to the political difficulties, stated by former
American Secretaries of State, Robert McNamara and Dr.
Kissinger, of keeping a response within the ambit of what has
been described as a limited or minimal response. The
assumption of escalation control seems unrealistic in the
context of nuclear attack.
(iv) with the use of even "small" or "tactical" or
"battlefield" nuclear weapons, one crosses the nuclear
threshold. The state at the receiving end of such a nuclear
response would not know that the response is a limited or
tactical one involving a small weapon and it is not credible to
posit that it will also be careful to respond in kind, i.e., with a
small weapon. The door would be opened and the threshold
crossed for an all-out nuclear war.
The scenario here under consideration is that of a
limited nuclear response to a nuclear attack. Since, as stated
above:
(a) the "controlled response" is unrealistic; and
(b) a "controlled response" by the nuclear power
making the first attack to the "controlled response" to its
first strike is even more unrealistic, the scenario we are
considering is one of all-out nuclear war, thus rendering the
use of the controlled weapon illegitimate.
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The assumption of a voluntary "brake" on the
recipient's full-scale use of nuclear weapons is, as observed
earlier in this Opinion, highly fanciful and speculative. Such
fanciful speculations provide a very unsafe assumption on
which to base the future of humanity.
(v) As was pointed out by one of the States appearing
before the Court: "it would be academic and unreal for any
analysis to seek to demonstrate that the use of a single
nuclear weapon in particular circumstances could be
consistent with principles of humanity. The reality is that if
nuclear weapons ever were used, this would be
overwhelmingly likely to trigger a nuclear war."
(vi) in the event of some power readying a nuclear
weapon for a strike, it may be argued that a pre-emptive
strike is necessary for self-defence. However, if such a preemptive strike is to be made with a "small" nuclear weapon
which by definition has no greater blast, heat or radiation
than a conventional weapon, the question would again arise
why a nuclear weapon should be used when a conventional
weapon would serve the same purpose.
(vii) the factor of accident must always be considered.
Nuclear weapons have never been tried out on the
battlefield. Their potential for limiting damage is untested
and is as yet the subject of theoretical assurances of
limitation. Having regard to the possibility of human error in
highly scientific operations-even to the extent of the
accidental explosion of a space rocket with all its passengers
aboard-one can never be sure that some error or accident
in construction may deprive the weapon of its so-called
"limited" quality. Indeed, apart from fine gradations
regarding the size of the weapon to be used, the very use of
any nuclear weapons under the stress of urgency is an area
fraught with much potential for accident. The UNIDIR
study, just mentioned, emphasizes the "very high risks of
escalation once a confrontation starts."
(viii) there is some doubt regarding the "smallness" of
tactical nuclear weapons, and no precise details regarding
these have been placed before the Court by any of the
nuclear powers. Malaysia, on the other hand, has referred
the Court to a United States law forbidding "research and
development which could lead to the production ... of a
low-yield nuclear weapon," which is defined as having a yield
of less than 5 kilotons (Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 15 and
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12 kilotons, respectively). Weapons of this firepower may, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, be presumed to be
fraught with all the dangers attendant on nuclear weapons,
as outlined earlier in this Opinion.
(ix) It is claimed a weapon could be used which could
be precisely aimed at a specific target. However, recent
experience in the Gulf War has shown that even the most
sophisticated or "small" weapons do not always strike their
intended target with precision. If there should be such error
in the case of nuclear weaponry, the consequence would be
of the gravest order.
(x) Having regard to WHO estimates of deaths ranging
from one million to one billion in the event of a nuclear war
which could well be triggered off by the use of the smallest
nuclear weapon, one can only endorse the sentiment which
Egypt placed before us when it observed that, having regard
to such a level of casualties: "even with the greatest
miniaturization, such speculative margins of risk are totally
abhorrent to the general principles of humanitarian law."
(xi) Taking the analogy of chemical or bacteriological
weapons, no one would argue that because a small amount
of such weapons will cause a comparatively small amount of
harm, therefore chemical or bacteriological weapons are not
illegal, seeing that they can be used in controllable
quantities. If, likewise, nuclear weapons are generally illegal,
there could not be an exception for "small weapons." If
nuclear weapons are intrinsically unlawful, they cannot be
rendered lawful by being used in small quantities or in
smaller versions. Likewise, if a state should be attacked with

chemical or bacteriological weapons, it seems absurd to
argue that it has the right to respond with small quantities of
such weapons. The fundamental reason that all such
weapons are not permissible, even in self-defence, for the
simple reason that their effects go beyond the needs of war,
200
is common to all these weapons.

c.

Radiation as a Secondary Effect of Nuclear Weapons

The United States seems to argue that if it chooses to use a
nuclear weapon, it would be doing so for the blast and heat
200. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996

I.C.J 226, 324-27 (July 8) (Weeramantry,J. dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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effects-and that the ongoing and outwardly spreading radiation
effects would not have been the focus of its intent in using the
weapon; hence the use would not to be unlawful. This is a variant
of the immediately preceding US defense of the lawfulness of the
use of nuclear weapons.
The United States makes this argument under several guises.
Most centrally, as seen above in the discussion of the
controllability point, the United States argues that it can deliver
its missiles carrying nuclear weapons to their targets with great
accuracy, so that, impliedly, the radiation effects should not
matter. Similarly, in its discussion of the prohibition of the use of
poisons, it argues that poisons are prohibited, but that it is
acceptable under international law to use other weapons-such
as nuclear weapons-that have poisons (here, radiation) as a side
effect. The United States contends that, because the delivery of
the poisons is accompanied by other effects (here, blast and
heat) that putatively are permissible, the overall use of the
weapon is acceptable.
The following are examples of the United States'
articulation of these positions in statements to the ICJ:
This argument is simply contrary to fact. Modem nuclear
weapon delivery systems are, indeed, capable of precisely
engaging discrete military objectives. 20 1
It has been argued that nuclear weapons are unlawful
because they cannot be directed at a military objective. This
argument ignores the ability of modem delivery systems to
target specific military objectives with nuclear weapons, and
the ability of modern weapons designers to tailor the effects
of a nuclear weapon to deal with various types of military
objectives. Since nuclear weapons can be directed at a
military objective, they can be used in a discriminate manner
and are not inherently indiscriminate. 20 2
[The prohibition of the use of poison weapons] was
established with particular reference to projectiles that carry
poison into the body of the victim. It was not intended to
201. ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 31, at 70.
202. US ICJ Written Statement, supra note 44, at 23 (citing ARMY, LAW OF LAND
WARFARE, supra note 28, at 5).
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apply, and has not been applied, to weapons that are
designed to injure or cause destruction by other means, even
though they also may create toxic byproducts.
For example, the prohibition on poison weapons does
not prohibit conventional explosives or incendiaries, even
though they may produce dangerous fumes. By the same
token, it does not prohibit nuclear weapons, which are
designed to injure or cause destruction by means other than
poisoning the victim, even though nuclear explosions may
also create toxic radioactive byproducts. 203
The United States made essentially the same argument to
the ICJ with respect to the application of the 1925 Geneva
Protocol's prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating or
poisonous gases, liquids, materials and devices, contending,
without citation of authority, that the protocol was "not
intended" to cover weapons that kill other than by the inhalation
or other absorption into the body of poisonous gases or
analogous substances 204 and that the prohibition of the use of
poison weapons in the 1907 Hague Convention was only
intended to cover the situation of projectiles that carry poison
into the body of the victim. 20 5
The United States further argued that the limitations on the
scope of these agreements are reflected in the fact that they do
not prohibit conventional explosives or incendiaries, even
though such weapons "may produce dangerous fumes":
This prohibition was intended to apply to weapons that are
designed to kill or injure by the inhalation or other
absorption into the body of poisonous gases or analogous
substances.
This prohibition was not intended to apply, and has not
been applied, to weapons that are designed to kill or injure
by other means, even though they may create asphyxiating or
poisonous byproducts. Once again, the Protocol does not
prohibit conventional explosives or incendiary weapons,
203. Id. at 23-24 (citing Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War,
and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art.

23(a), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277).
204. See id. at 24-25 (citing F. Kalshoven, Arms, Armaments and International Law,
191 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT'L L. 183,
283-84 (1985)).
205. See id. at 24.
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even though they may produce asphyxiating or poisonous
byproducts, and it likewise does not prohibit nuclear
weapons.20 6
The Navy, in an 1989 edition of the Annotated Supplement to
the Naval Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,
elaborated on the US position:
Poison Gas Analogy. It has been contended that nuclear
radiation is sufficiently comparable to a poison gas to justify
extending the 1925 Gas Protocol's prohibition to include the
use of nuclear weapons. However, this ignores the explosive,
heat and blast effects of a nuclear burst, and disregards the
fact that fall-out is a by-product which is not the main or
most characteristic feature of the weapon. The same riposte
is available to meet an argument that the use of nuclear
weapons would violate the prohibition on the use of
poisoned weapons, set out in article 23(a) of the Hague
Regulations. 207
Thus, the US position seems to be that the explosive, heat,
and blast effects of a nuclear weapon are the primary effects and
radiation is only an incidental "by-product," which is not "the
main or most characteristic feature" of the weapon; this
secondary nature of radiation eliminates or diminishes its legal
significance as an effect of the use of nuclear weapons.
The authors are not aware of a legal basis for this putative
rule that secondary effects of weapons, such as radiation, do not
count in the legal analysis. Such a limitation on IHL would defeat
its purpose. Certainly the "dangerous fumes" produced by
conventional explosives or incendiaries are not factually or
legally comparable to radiation from nuclear weapons, which is
carried forward on a virtually unlimited basis in space and time.
While the ICJ concluded that the various conventions
banning the use of poisons in warfare were not understood, in
the practice of states, as referring to nuclear weapons,2 08 it
206. Id. at 24-25 (citing Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,
June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65; Kalshoven, supra note 204 at 284).
207. NAvAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK 1989 SUPPLEMENT, supranote 28, at 10-2.

208. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
IC.J. 226, 11 54-55 (July 8) (referencing Second Hague Declaration of 29 July 1899;
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land Annexed to the Hague
Convention IV of 18 October 1907, Article 23 (a); and Geneva Protocol of 17 June
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provided no support for the proposition that the radiation effects
of nuclear weapons are irrelevant under IHL.
d. Use of Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons in Remote Areas
As discussed above, the United States' primary defense of
the lawfulness of nuclear weapons before the ICJ was based on
the premise that the United States has low-yield nuclear weapons,
the effects of which it can control, with the United States
postulating what it characterized as "plausible scenarios, such as
a small number of accurate attacks by low-yield weapons against
an equally small number of military targets in nonurban areas.2 09
While, as noted above, 210 the United States did not define in
its presentations to the ICJ what it meant by "low-yield" nuclear
weapons, the term at the time was defined in the Joint Chiefs of
Staff's manual DoctrineforJoint Theater Nuclear Operations-very low
(less than 1 kiloton); low (1 kiloton to 10 kilotons); medium
(over 10 kilotons to 50 kilotons); high (over 50 kilotons to 500
kilotons); and very high (over 500 kilotons).211
The US argument in this regard seems to lack substantial
merit. While the United States maintains some low-yield nuclear
weapons, the US arsenal is made up predominately of high-yield
nuclear weapons.21 2 In addition, as discussed above, even the lowyield nuclear weapons are unlawful under IHL, inter alia,
because their effects are uncontrollable. 21 3
Use of low-yield nuclear weapons would also appear
potentially to be precluded under international law because
virtually any military objectives for which such weapons might be
used could also be addressed by conventional weapons; the rules
of necessity and proportionality prohibit the use of nuclear
weapons if the military objective could be achieved through
conventional weapons.2 14
In addition, this argument by the United States ignores the
likely effects of counter-strike and escalation, effects which have
1925).
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 31, at 71.
See supranotes 170-75 and accompanying text.
JOINT THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 28, at GL-3.
See Norris & Kristensen, supra note 163, at 57.
See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 62-83 and accompanying text.
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to be included in the legal analysis. Theoretical scenarios of
ideal-condition strikes with no collateral effects or resultant
escalation are not a realistic basis upon which to conduct the
legal analysis or establish legal norms.
The US argument raises questions about whether the
production, deployment, and other policies regarding nuclear
weapons are based on exceptional circumstances, extraordinary
events in which a nuclear weapon might theoretically be used in
compliance with law, or on real-world circumstances as to likely
use. 215
e. Use of Nuclear Weapons in Reprisal for Another State's
Unlawful First Use
The United States took the position before the ICJ that it
would potentially be lawful to use nuclear weapons in reprisal
even if it were unlawful to use them in the first instance:
Even if it were to be concluded-as we clearly have not-that
the use of nuclear weapons would necessarily be unlawful,
the customary law of reprisal permits a belligerent to
respond to another party's violation of the law of armed
conflict by itself resorting to what otherwise would be
unlawful conduct.216
Acknowledging that reprisals must be taken with intent to
cause the enemy to cease violations of the law of armed conflict
and after all other means of securing compliance have been
exhausted, and that they must be proportionate to the violations,
the United States, in its memorandum to the ICJ, took the
position that the legality of reprisals must be determined on a
case-by-case basis.2 17

215. Comparable arguments were made in support of the lawfulness of cluster
munitions. For example, the contention was made that such munitions are better suited
to attacking a machine gun nest on top of a dam than an explosive that might damage
the dam, jeopardizing downstream civilians. SeeJOHN BORRIE, UNNACEPTABLE HARM: A
HISTORY OF HOW THE TREATY TO BAN CLUSTER MUNITIONS WAS WON 331 (2009). In

view of the broad range of cases in which use of cluster munitions causes indiscriminate
and long-lasting harm, such arguments were rejected by the states that negotiated the
convention banning the munitions. Convention on Cluster Munitions, Dec. 3, 2008, 48
I.L.M. 357.
216. ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 31, at 75.
217. See US ICJ Written Statement, supra note 44, at 30; see also ICJ Hearing, Nov.
15, 1995, supra note 31, at 72.
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The United States further dismissed as inapplicable to
nuclear weapons, and as new provisions not assimilated into
customary law, the provisions of Additional Protocol I containing
prohibitions on reprisals against specific types of persons or
objects, including, the civilian population or individual civilians,
civilian objects, cultural objects and places of worship, objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, the
natural environment, and works and installations containing
dangerous forces.218
The Navy, in an earlier edition of its Naval Commander's
Handbook, hedged the issue, saying that targeting enemy civilians
in reprisal was "lawful[]" and "legitimate" but "not appropriate":
Reprisals may lawfully be taken against enemy individuals
who have not yet fallen into the hands of the forces making
the reprisals. While the United States has always considered
that civilian persons are not appropriate objects of attack in
reprisal, members of the enemy civilian population are still
legitimate objects of reprisals. However, since they are
excluded from this category by the 1977 Protocol I
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, for nations
party thereto, enemy civilians and the enemy civilian
population are prohibited objects of reprisal by their armed
forces. The United States has found this new prohibition to
be militarily unacceptable.2 19
It seems highly unlikely that a state considering the use of
nuclear weapons in reprisal for an adversary's use of nuclear
weapons would-or would even be able to-comply with the
legal requirements for reprisals. Almost inevitably, the use of
nuclear weapons in reprisal to respond to a prior unlawful use of
nuclear weapons by the adversary would be excessive and would
likely lead to escalation and an expansion of the scope of the
violence.
The above-referenced requirements that reprisals be both
necessary to make the adversary comply with the law and
proportionate to the offending violation would appear to make
nuclear reprisals unlawful because the effects of nuclear weapons

218. See US ICJ Written Statement, supra note 44, at 31 (referencing Additional
Protocol I, supranote 43, arts. 51(6), 52(1), 53(c), 54(4), 55(2), 56(4)).
219. NAVAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK 1989 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 28, at 6-18
n.33 (1989).

2011]

NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IHL, AND THE NPT

663

are uncontrollable-and hence cannot be limited or constrained
within such requirements. 220 Consider the potential effects of the
second use in reprisal: the sheer destructiveness of the nuclear
weapon(s) used; the electromagnetic and radiation effects; the
long-term effects of radioactive fallout; and the risks of hitting
the wrong target, precipitating escalation to higher levels of
nuclear warfare, precipitating the enemy's or even one's own
further preemptive strikes, and precipitating chemical or
biological weapons use. Any one of these effects would likely
exceed the level of action necessary to convince the other side to
constrain itself to lawful warfare and would be so provocative as
to cause the opposite effect, precipitating total violence. Taken
together, these effects would appear to be of a radically different
nature and order than that contemplated by the law of reprisal. 221
Given the uncontrollability of such effects, how could a state
considering a nuclear reprisal reasonably believe that it could
limit the strike to that necessary to induce the adversary to follow
the law in the future? Without such a reasonable belief, how
could the state be said to intend the reprisal to be within the
legal limits?
And is it not clear, given all that is known of the
practicalities of nuclear strategy, that the purported use of
nuclear weapons in reprisal would almost inevitably be designed
to punish the enemy and, in the case of a substantial nuclear
adversary, to use one's own nuclear assets before they could be
preemptively struck by the adversary and to attempt to
preemptively strike the adversary's nuclear assets (many of which
would likely be "co-located" with civilian targets) before they
could be used? Even assuming adequate command and control,
crucial decisions would have to be made within a very short time
and would likely be dictated largely by existing war plans
contemplating nuclear weapons use. The notion of a second
strike as limited to the legitimate objectives of reprisal seems
oxymoronic.
Thus, the very idea of a state's nuclear strike in reprisal
against an adversary's first strike in reprisal is unrealistic, given
the real purposes the state would have in conducting the second
strike. The result is that the second strike would be subject to all
220. See supra Part I.F.5, I.H.2.a, and accompanying text.
221. See supra Part I.B.e and accompanying text.
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of the requirements of IHL discussed above, including the
requirements of discrimination, proportionality, necessity, and
controllability.
The very premise of the attempted justification of the
second use as a reprisal (the assumption that the first strike was
unlawful for failure to comply with such rules as those of
necessity, proportionality, distinction, and the corollary
requirement of controllability), portends the unlawfulness of the
second use in reprisal. Just as the likely effects of the first use
were impermissibly excessive and far reaching under the
referenced rules of IHL, so too would be the likely effects of the
second under the requirements of IHL for reprisals.
It must be recognized that the second use in reprisal would
likely carry greater risks of impermissible effects than the first.
Specifically, even assuming that the adversary's first use could
have been conducted in such a limited fashion as not to threaten
impermissible effects, the second use-constituting a mutual
willingness to engage in nuclear war and the heightened
likelihood of precipitating major escalation-would involve the
risk of even more severe and uncontrollable effects.
While one can conjure up reprisals comparable to the
limited strikes at remote sea or desert targets that were the focus
of the US defense of nuclear weapons before the ICJ, such
legalistic exercises are unrealistic in the real world context of the
types of circumstances in which these weapons might be used
and their potential effects, and cannot reasonably serve as the
basis for the evaluation of lawfulness.
Even if one hypothesizes a lawful nuclear reprisal using a
low-yield nuclear weapons in a remote area to convince the
adversary to step back from the precipice of nuclear mutual
destruction, does such a theoretical exercise serve to justify the
lawfulness of huge nuclear arsenals such as those of the United
States, made up predominately of nuclear weapons with yields of
between 100 and over 400 kilotons?
It is also clear that a nuclear reprisal could not satisfy the
prerequisite of being necessary if the reprising state could
achieve the objective with conventional weapons. For the United
States, given its conventional weapons capabilities, this would be
a hard test to meet in many circumstances, particularly in
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connection with an armed conflict against a smaller nuclear
weapons state possessing a limited number of such weapons.
The ICJ, in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, did not
express a conclusion about reprisals:
Certain States asserted that the use of nuclear weapons
in the conduct of reprisals would be lawful. The Court does
not have to examine, in this context, the question of armed
reprisals in time of peace, which are considered to be
unlawful. Nor does it have to pronounce on the question of
belligerent reprisals save to observe that in any case any right
of recourse to such reprisals would, like self-defence, be
governed inter aliaby the principle of proportionality.22 2
However, as noted above, the court did conclude that states
"must never make civilians the object of attack and must
consequently never use weapons that are incapable of
distinguishing between civilian and military targets."223
The ICJ also did not express a conclusion on the issue of the
applicability of Additional Protocol I to nuclear weapons, except
to note that, to the extent that that Protocol merely codified preexisting customary law, said customary law remained in effect:
Nor is there any need for the Court to elaborate on the
question of the applicability of Additional Protocol 1 of 1977
to nuclear weapons. It need only observe that while, at the
Diplomatic Conference of 1974-1977, there was no
substantive debate on the nuclear issue and no specific
solution concerning this question was put forward,
Additional Protocol 1 in no way replaced the general
customary rules applicable to all means and methods of
combat including nuclear weapons. In particular, the Court
recalls that all States are bound by those rules in Additional
Protocol 1 which, when adopted, were merely the expression
of the pre-existing customary law, such as the Martens
Clause, reaffirmed in the first article of Additional Protocol
1. The fact that certain types of weapons were not specifically
dealt with by the 1974-1977 Conference does not permit the
drawing of any legal conclusions relating to the substantive
issues which the use of such weapons would raise. 224
222. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 1 46 (July 8).
223. Id. 1 78.
224. Id. 84.
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The International Committee of the Red Cross ("ICRC"), in
a recent study Customary International Humanitarian Law,
concluded that while state practice may not yet have led to a
customary rule specifically prohibiting reprisals against civilians,
there appears to be at least a trend in favor of prohibiting such
reprisals:
Because of existing contrary practice, albeit very limited,
it is difficult to conclude that there has yet crystallised a
customary rule specifically prohibiting reprisals against
civilians during the conduct of hostilities. Nevertheless, it is
also difficult to assert that a right to resort to such reprisals
continues to exist on the strength of the practice of only a
limited number of States, some of which is also ambiguous.
Hence, there appears, at a minimum, to exist a trend in
favour of prohibiting such reprisals. The International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in its review of
the indictment in the Martie case in 1996 and in its
judgment in the Kupregkie case in 2000, found that there was
such a prohibition already in existence, based largely on the
imperatives of humanity or public conscience. These are
important indications, consistent with a substantial body of
practice now condemning or outlawing such reprisals."2
The ICRC's sense that there is, at a minimum, a trend in
favor of prohibiting reprisals against civilians is supported by the
ICJ's finding in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion that states
"must never make civilians the object of attack and must
consequently never use weapons that are incapable of
distinguishing between civilian and military targets."2 26 Also
supporting this conclusion is the recognition by the US military
that reprisals against civilians are "not appropriate."2 2 7
Mexico's Ambassador Sergio Gonzdlez Gilvez addressed the
ICJ on this point in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion:
"Torture is not a permissible response to torture. Nor is mass
rape acceptable retaliation to mass rape. Just as unacceptable is

225. IJEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, CUSTOMARY HUMANITARIAN INTERNATIONAL LAw, 523 (2009) (citations

omitted).
226. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 1 78.
227. NAVAL COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 6-18 n.33.
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retaliatory deterrence-'You have burnt my city, I will burn
yours."'"228

Professor Eric David, on behalf of Solomon Islands, stated
before the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion:
If the dispatch of a nuclear weapon causes a million deaths,
retaliation with another nuclear weapon which will also cause
a million deaths will perhaps protect the sovereignty of the
state suffering the first strike, and will perhaps satisfy the
victim's desire for revenge, but it will not satisfy
humanitarian law, which will have been breached not once
but twice, and two wrongs do not make a right.229
One can speculate that the United States has refused to
ratify Protocol I and has resisted the contemporary prohibition of
reprisals against civilians in an effort to strengthen the perceived
efficacy of its policy of nuclear deterrence. Yet the question must
be faced as to whether the price-the continuation of the hairtrigger nuclear world and the inevitable resultant proliferationis worth the putative benefit.
f. Need for Evaluation of the Use of Nuclear Weapons on a
Case-by-Case Basis
The United States' overriding position is that the lawfulness
of the use of nuclear weapons cannot be determined
categorically or in the abstract, but must be made on an ad hoc
basis. This position is not tenable. From the United States' own
statements of the matter, the reality is that the time within which
the United States would have to decide whether to use nuclear
weapons under crisis conditions would be too short, realistically,
to allow sufficient time to weigh the legalities of the matter. As a
result, the position that the matter is to be evaluated on an ad
hoc basis in practical terms means that the legalities would not be
considered.
For example, the Joint Chiefs, in their earlier Doctrine for
Joint Nuclear Operations, emphasized the extremely short periods
228. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
Verbatim Record, 51 (Nov. 3, 1995, 10 a.m.), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/95/5931.pdf.
229. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
Verbatim Record, 49 (Nov. 14, 1995, 10:35 a.m.), available at http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/95/5943.pdf (authors' translation).
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of time-often matters of minutes or even seconds-that would
be available for crucial decision making in nuclear
confrontations: "Very short timelines impact decisions that must
be made. In a matter of seconds for the defense, and minutes for the
offense, critical decisions must be made in concert with
discussions with NCA."23 0 The same document also noted the
need for decisive strikes, once the decision to go nuclear has
been made:
Some targets must be struck quickly once a decision to
employ nuclear weapons has been made. Just as important is
the requirement to promptly strike high-priority, timesensitive targets that emerge after the conflict begins.
Because force employment requirements may evolve at
irregular intervals, some surviving nuclear weapons must be
capable of striking these targets within the brief time
available. Responsiveness (measured as the interval between
the decision to strike a specific target and detonation of a
weapon over that target) is critical to ensure engaging some
emerging targets.2 3'
In their earlier manual Doctrine for Joint Theater Nuclear
Operations, the Joint Chiefs further emphasized the potential time
constraints and the need for quick ad hoc judgments as to
targeting:
Because preplanned theater nuclear options do not
exist for every scenario, [commanders in chief] must have a
capability to plan and execute nuclear options for nuclear
forces generated on short notice during crisis and
emergency situations. During crisis action planning,
geographic combatant commanders evaluate their theater
situation and propose courses of action or initiate a request
for nuclear support.23 2
Against this background, the US position that the lawfulness
of the use of nuclear weapons must be made on an ad hoc basis
according to the circumstances of each contemplated use is
problematic from a practical perspective and unsupportable as a
matter of law. With only minutes (or even hours) to make these
huge decisions involving many pragmatic considerations, ad hoc
230. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 184, at 111-8 (emphasis added).
231. Id. at 11-3-4 (emphasis omitted).
232. JOINT THEATER NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, supra note 28, at III-10 (emphasis
omitted).
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legal evaluation would likely amount to little or no legal
evaluation. The result is the virtual abnegation of IHL, in effect
putting nuclear weapons and the policy of deterrence largely
outside the realm of law.
But it does not-and should not-have to be this way. The
effects of nuclear weapons are already clear. The excessive and
unnecessary nature of such effects can be evaluated now on a
categorical basis from which the unlawfulness of their use
becomes apparent.
g. No General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons unless the
United States Agrees to Such a Prohibition
The United States argued before the ICJ that there is no
conventional or customary rule outlawing the use of nuclear
weapons because the United States has not consented to such a
rule-and that, accordingly, the lawfulness of each potential use
of nuclear weapons must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Conrad K. Harper, Legal Advisor of the United States
Department of State, told the court that its "starting point in
examining the merits" should be "the fundamental principle of
international law that restrictions on States cannot be presumed,
but must be established by conventional law specifically accepted
by them, or in customary law established by the conduct of the
community of nations."23 3
Michael J. Matheson, the Deputy Legal Advisor to the US
Department of State, in his presentation to the court, made the
same point: restrictions upon states must "be found in
conventional law specifically accepted by States, or in customary
law generally accepted as such by the community of nations." 234
Matheson relied upon the court's statement in the Nicaraguacase
that "in international law there are no rules, other than such
rules as may be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or
otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State
can be limited."23 5
This US position on this point, as presented to the ICJ,
overlooks the existence of other sources of international law,
233. ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supranote 31, at 57.

234. Id. at 60.
235. Id. (quoting Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 269 (June 27)).
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including general principles of law. Moreover, it ignores the fact
that the United States, as evidenced by the numerous references
to US military documents in this Article, recognizes that the
broad rules of the law of armed conflict-such as the rules of
distinction, proportionality and necessity and the corollary
requirement of controllability-apply to any application of force,
including nuclear weapons.2 3 6
Once the applicability of such rules is acknowledged, the
United States is bound by their application regardless of whether
it agrees with the particular application. Neither the consensual
basis of international law nor the principle of sovereignty limits
the application of established rules of law. If the use of nuclear
weapons is per se unlawful under those principles, the United
States and other nuclear weapons states are subject to such
unlawfulness fully as much as if they had signed a convention or
purposefully joined in the formation of custom to that effect.
The Air Force, in its prior Manual on International Law,
stated that the use of a weapon may be unlawful based not only
on "expressed prohibitions contained in specific rules of custom
and convention," but also on "those prohibitions laid down in
the general principles of the law of war."23 7 The manual noted
that the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in the
Major War Criminals case found that international law is
contained not only in treaties and custom but also in the
"general principles of justice applied by jurists and practiced by
military courts."238 Similarly, in discussing how the lawfulness of
new weapons and methods of warfare is determined, the manual
stated that such determination is made based on international
treaty or custom, upon "analogy to weapons or methods
previously determined to be lawful or unlawful," and upon the
236. The United States has recognized these rules as arising under customary and
treaty law and general principles of law. See supra notes 44-96 and accompanying text. In
its arguments before the ICJ, the United States acknowledged that scientific evidence
could justify a total prohibition of nuclear weapons if it demonstrated the unlawfulness
of all such uses: "[S]cientific evidence could onlyjustify a total prohibition on the use of
nuclear weapons if such evidence covers the full range of variables and circumstances
that might be involved in such uses." ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 31, at 71.
237. AIR FORCE, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 28, at 6-1, 6-9 & n.3
While this manual no longer appears to be in effect, the authors are not aware of any
reason to believe that the law relating to the development of international law has
changed.
238. Id. at 1-6.
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evaluation of the compliance of such new weapons or methods
with established principles of law, such as the rules of necessity,
discrimination and proportionality.2 39 Furthermore, the practice
of states "does not modify" the legal obligation to comply with
treaty obligations since such obligations are "contractual in
nature."2 o
The Army's Law of Land Warfare states that " [t]he conduct
of armed hostilities on land is regulated by the law of land
warfare which is both written and unwritten." 24 1
The United States recognizes "analogy" as well as "general
principles" as sources of the law of armed conflict. The Air Force
Manual on InternationalLaw states:
The law of armed conflict affecting aerial operations is
not entirely codified. Therefore, the law applicable to air
warfare must be derived from general principles,
extrapolated from the law affecting land or sea warfare, or
derived from other sources including the practice of states
reflected in a wide variety of sources. Yet the US is a party to
numerous treaties which affect aerial operations either
directly or by analogy. 242
The manual noted that per se unlawfulness is not limited to
prohibitions established in treaties or customary law: "[A] new
weapon or method of warfare may be illegal, per se, if it is
restricted by international law including treaty or international
custom. The issue is resolved, or attempted to be resolved, by
analogy to weapons or methods previously determined to be
lawful or unlawful."24 3
Based on the foregoing, it seemed clear that the use of
nuclear weapons can be per se unlawful regardless of whether
there is a treaty or custom establishing such unlawfulness. The
authors conclude that the known effects of nuclear weapons, as
described above, 2" are such that the use of nuclear weapons,
even low-yield nuclear weapons, would be unlawful in virtually all
circumstances.

239. See id. at 6-7.
240. Id. at 1-15 n.35.
241. ARMY, LAW OF LAND WARFARE, supra note 28, at 3.
242. AIR FORCE, MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 28, at 1-7.

243. Id. at 6-7.
244. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
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h. Lawfulness of the Threat of Use of All Nuclear Weapons in
the US Arsenal if the Use of Any Nuclear Weapon in that Arsenal
Is Lawful
The US argument that the threat of the use of all nuclear
weapons in the US arsenal is lawful if the use of any nuclear
weapon in that arsenal is lawful was alluded to in the discussion
of the controllability point. It makes no sense and is legally
untenable to argue that the threat and use of the state's entire
nuclear arsenal is lawfdl because some of its low-yield weapons
could possibly be used within permissible parameters.
That seems, however, to be the US position. As noted
above, 245 the United States, in its defense of nuclear weapons
before the ICJ, focused on its ability to use low-yield nuclear
weapons in a surgical way, limiting collateral effects and
complying with international law. Yet the United States continues
to maintain an arsenal composed mostly of nuclear weapons with
yields of between 100 and over 500 kilotons, to keep those
weapons at alert for use, and to threaten their use through the
policy of nuclear deterrence. Other nuclear weapons states are
doing the same.
i.

The Characterization that the ICJ Found the Use of Nuclear
Weapons to Be Lawful

Subsequent to the ICJ decision, the US military manuals
seem to suggest that the ICJ, in effect, found the use and threat
of use of nuclear weapons to be lawful. For example, the Army, in
its 2010 Law of War Deskbook, states, "Not prohibited by
international law[:] In 1996, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) issued an advisory opinion that '[t]here is in neither
customary nor international law any comprehensive and
universal prohibition of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.' "246
The manual continues:
However, by a split vote, the ICJ also found that "[t]he threat
or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict." The
ICJ stated that it could not definitively conclude whether the
245. See supra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
246. ARMY, LAW OF WAR DESKBOOK, supra note 28, at 153 (quoting Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 1 105 (July 8)).
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threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful
in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very
survival of the state would be at stake.247
The Army's 2010 Operational Law Handbook contains nearly
identical statements.2 48
While the foregoing language is subject to interpretation,
the authors have the impression that the United States has
generally interpreted the ICJ decision as giving permission to use
nuclear weapons. Yet, as is evident from the discussion above,249
this is an inaccurate characterization of the court's decision and
of the United States' broader position as to the applicability of
the law of war to nuclear weapons.
Specifically, as discussed above, 25 0 the United States has
repeatedly acknowledged that the use of nuclear weapons is
subject to the requirements of IHL, including the rules of
distinction, necessity, and proportionality, and the corollary rule
of controllability.
In addition, it is inaccurate to say that the ICJ found the use
of nuclear weapons not to be prohibited under international law.
As discussed above, 25 1 the court found the use of nuclear
weapons to be subject to IHL. It further found that the use of
nuclear weapons "seems scarcely reconcilable" with such
requirements2 52 and "would generally be contrary to the rules of
international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular
the principles and rules of humanitarian law."253 The court then
went on to say that
in view of the current state of international law, and of the
elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons
would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of
self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at
stake. 254
247. Id.
248. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAw HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 19 (quoting Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 1 105).
249. See supranotes 52-113, 149-62 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 52-113, 149-62 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
252. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 1 95.
253. Id. 1 105.
254. Id.
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This is far from finding that the use of nuclear weapons is not
prohibited by international law.

j.

The Implicit Argument that Nuclear Weapons May Be Used
in Extreme Circumstances of Self-Defense

As discussed above, the United States, in its arguments to
the ICJ, acknowledged that the use and threat of use of nuclear
weapons is subject to IHL.25 5 Thus, the United States did not take
the position before the ICJ that a state's right of self-defense
overrides international law. However, the United States, in the
2010 Nuclear Posture Review issued by the Obama
Administration, states several times that it would only use nuclear
weapons in "extreme circumstances." 256
It is not clear if this language was intended to invoke the
ICJ's formulation of extreme circumstances of self-defense, but if
it was, or if it was intended to suggest that extreme circumstances
render use of nuclear weapons more lawful, it must be addressed.
The ICJ was explicit that it was not determining that the use of
nuclear weapons is lawful in extreme circumstances of selfdefense in which the very survival of a state is at stake; it said,
quite differently, that it was unable to reach a conclusion on this
point.
In addition, while the language of the ICJ decision was
unclear at some points, the totality of the ICJ decision, as
discussed above,25 7 was clear that a state's exercise of its right of
self-defense, whether it be in "extreme" or non-extreme selfdefense, is subject to IHL. A state's exercise of the right of selfdefense must "conform[] to the fundamental principles of the
law of armed conflict regulating the conduct of hostilities." 25 8
The court noted, for example, that the exercise by a state of
the right of self-defense must comply, inter alia, with the
principle of proportionality:
The entitlement to resort to self-defence under Article
51 [of the UN Charter] is subject to certain constraints.
255. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
256. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW REPORT viii-ix, 16-17
(2010).

257. See supra notes 150-62 and accompanying text.
258. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226,

1

91 (quoting

Written Statement of the Government of the United Kingdom, supra note 31,

T

3.44).
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Some of these constraints are inherent in the very concept of
self-defence. Other requirements are specified in Article 51.
The submission of the exercise of the right of selfdefence to the conditions of necessity and proportionality is
a rule of customary international law. As the Court stated in
the case concerning Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and
againstNicaragua (Nicaraguav. United States of America): there

is a "specific rule whereby self-defence would warrant only
measures which are proportional to the armed attack and
necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in
customary international law." This dual condition applies
equally to Article 51 of the Charter, whatever the means of
force employed.
The proportionality principle may thus not in itself
exclude the use of nuclear weapons in self-defence in all
circumstances. But at the same time, a use of force that is
proportionate under the law of self-defence, must, in order to be
lawful, also meet the requirements of the law applicable in armed

conflict which comprise in particular the principles and rules
of humanitarian law.259
In addition, as discussed above, 260 the very purpose of IHL is to
address the exigencies of war.
I.

Threat and Deterrence

There are cogent reasons to conclude that the use of
nuclear weapons would be unlawful under IHL. This has
significant implications for the policy of nuclear deterrence
followed by the nuclear weapons states.
Specifically, the ICJ concluded in the Nuclear Weapons
advisory opinion, and the states before the court generally
agreed, that it is unlawful under international law for a state to
threaten to do that which it would be unlawful to do. The court
stated, "If an envisaged use of weapons would not meet the
requirements of humanitarian law, a threat to engage in such use
would also be contrary to that law."261
Then, in its discussion of the status of deterrence under the
UN Charter, the court indicated that a threat to perform an act
259. Id. 11 40-42 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
260. See supraPart I.G.

261. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996

I.C.J. 226,

78.

676 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 34:595

violative of IHL violates not only that law but also the charter.
The court said that "[t]he notions of 'threat' and 'use' of force
under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter stand together in
the sense that if the use of force itself in a given case is illegalfor whatever reason-the threat to use such force will likewise be
illegal." 262 "For whatever reason" would incorporate IHL.
The court also said:
Whether [a policy of deterrence] is a "threat" contrary to
Article 2, paragraph 4, depends upon whether the particular
use of force envisaged would be directed against the
territorial integrity or political independence of a State, or
against the Purposes of the United Nations or whether, in
the event that it were intended as a means of defence, it
would necessarily violate the principles of necessity and
proportionality. 265
The court had stated earlier in its discussion of
proportionality as a condition for the exercise of self-defense (as
opposed to proportionality in carrying out a particular military
operation) that proportionality requires conformity with IHL. 264
The United States, in its written and oral arguments to the
ICJ, acknowledged that deterrence would be invalidated if the
use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful. Michael J. Matheson,
on behalf of the United States, in his oral argument to the court,
stated:
[E]ach of the Permanent Members of the Security Council
has made an immense commitment of human and material
resources to acquire and maintain stocks of nuclear weapons
and their delivery systems, and many other States have
decided to rely for their security on these nuclear
capabilities. If these weapons could not lawfully be used in
individual or collective self-defense under any circumstances,
there would be no credible threat of such use in response to
aggression and deterrent policies would be futile and
meaningless. In this sense, it is impossible to separate the
policy of deterrence from the legality of the use of the means
of deterrence. Accordingly, any affirmation of a general
prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons would be directly

262. Id. 47.
263. Id.
264. Id. 41.
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contrary to one of the fundamental premises of the national
security policy of each of these many States. 265
This formal statement by the US representatives is a powerful
confirmation of the significant point that the lawfulness of the
policy of nuclear deterrence depends upon the lawfulness of the
underlying use. If nuclear weapons cannot lawfully be used, their
use may not be lawfully threatened. As Mr. Matheson put it so
memorably, if nuclear weapons could not lawfully be used, "there
would be no credible threat of such use in response to aggression
and deterrent policies would be futile and meaningless."2 66
This limitation on the lawfulness of the policy of deterrence
becomes particularly significant in light of the fact discussed
above that the United States' defense of the lawfulness of the use
of nuclear weapons has been focused upon the defense of the
use of low-yield nuclear weapons.2 6 7
The importance of clarifying the legal status of nuclear
weapons under international law is confirmed by the United
States' explicit statement in its memorandum to the ICJ that the
United States would not acquire and maintain nuclear weapons
and the attendant delivery systems if it were known that the use
of the weapons was unlawful:
It is well known that the Permanent Members of the
Security Council possess nuclear weapons and have
developed and deployed systems for their use in armed
conflict. These States would not have borne the expense and
effort of acquiring and maintaining these weapons and
delivery systems if they believed that the use of nuclear
weapons was generally prohibited. On the contrary, the
possible use of these weapons is an important factor in the
structure of their military establishments, the development
of their security doctrines and strategy, and their efforts to
prevent aggression and provide an essential element of the
exercise of their right of self-defense.26 8
Given the legal rule that a threat is unlawful if the
underlying action would be unlawful, it is evident that there are
265.
266.
267.
268.

ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supranote 31, at 62-63.
Id. at 63.
See supraPart I.H.2.a.
US ICJ Written Statement, supra note 44, at 14 (citing U.N. Secretary-General,

General and Complete Disarmament: Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons: Rep. of the

Secretary-General,

1

44-81, U.N. Doc. A/45/373 (Sept. 18, 1990)).
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serious questions whether the policy of nuclear deterrence
followed by nuclear weapons states can withstand analysis. The
authors' conclusion that the use of nuclear weapons, even of lowyield nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances of self-defense,
would be unlawful under the law of armed conflict suggests that
the policy of deterrence is equally unlawful.

II. THE NPT COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
This Article has shown that the United States accepts rules
of IHL and accepts that they apply to nuclear weapons. That
position is shared by other states with nuclear weapons. As the
ICJ noted in its advisory opinion:
None of the statements made before the Court in any way
advocated a freedom to use nuclear weapons without regard
to humanitarian constraints. Quite the reverse; it has been
explicitly stated,
"Restrictions set by the rules applicable to armed
conflicts in respect of means and methods of warfare
to nuclear weapons"
definitely also extend
(Russian Federation);
"So far as the customary law of war is concerned, the
United Kingdom has always accepted that the use of
nuclear weapons is subject to the general principles of
the jus in bello" (United Kingdom);
and
"The United States has long shared the view that the
law of armed conflict governs the use of nuclear
weapons-just as it governs the use of conventional
weapons" (United States of America).269
Moreover, the content of the applicable rules in the main is
reasonably clear, though there can be disputes about the details.
This is demonstrated by a major study, Customary Humanitarian
International Law, originally published in 2005 by the ICRC.270
The ICRC has a well-deserved reputation as the guardian of IHL.
The study is an authoritative statement of the requirements of
269. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 1 86 (quoting
ICJ Hearing, Nov. 10, 1995, supra note 30; ICJ Hearing, Nov. 15, 1995, supra note 31).
270. HENCKAERTS & DoswALD-BECK, supranote 225.
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IHL. It identifies IHL rules based upon exhaustive research into
state practice and legal opinion as manifested by armed-forces
manuals on the law of armed conflict, multilateral treaties,
including Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions and the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, and other sources.
The ICRC formulations are generally consistent with those found
in the US sources discussed in Part I of this Article.
Among the general rules identified by the ICRC, most
relevant to nuclear weapons are the prohibition of indiscriminate
attacks, the requirement of proportionality in attack, the
prohibition of means of attack causing unnecessary suffering,
and the requirement of due regard for protection and
preservation of the natural environment. "Indiscriminate
attacks" are defined as those:
(a) which are not directed at a specific military objective; (b)
which employ a method or means of combat which cannot
be directed at a specific military objective; or (c) which
employ a method or means of combat the effects of which
cannot be limited as required by international humanitarian
law; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to
strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects
without distinction.27 1
"Proportionality in attack" prohibits "launching an attack which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated." 272 "The use of means and
methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited."2 7 3 "Due regard for
the environment" imposes a requirement of proportionality in
attack with respect to damage to the environment.27 4 Further,
" [t] he use of methods or means of warfare that are intended, or
may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment is prohibited. Destruction of
the natural environment may not be used as a weapon."2 75 Many
271. Id. at 40.
272. Id. at 46.
273. Id. at 237.
274. Id. at 143, 147.
275. Id. at 151. While the prohibition of causing widespread, long-term, and severe
damage to the natural environment is a rule codified in Additional Protocol I to the
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of the numerous specific rules identified by the study, for
example those protecting hospitals and cultural property, also
are applicable in view of the immense effects of nuclear weapons.
Given that states accept the binding nature of IHL and that
IHL is reasonably well defined, what is the significance of the
2010 NPT Review Conference declaration of "the need for all
States at all times to comply with applicable international law,
including international humanitarian law"?276
First, NPT parties have now taken on the existing obligation
of compliance with IHL with respect to nuclear weapons as an
NPT commitment for which they are accountable within the NPT
review process. That NPT commitment is embedded within the
matrix of commitments for implementation of the fundamental
NPT Article VI obligation of good-faith negotiation of nuclear
disarmament. Second, in subtle but nonetheless important ways,
the commitment advances beyond the conclusions of the ICJ
advisory opinion and reinforces a rigorous application of IHL.
These points are analyzed below and then the policy implications
of the commitment are explained.
A.

Compliance with IHL as an NPT Commitment

1. Background on the NPT and the 2010 Review Conference
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty entered into force in
1970 and currently has 189 states parties. Three states, all now
with nuclear arsenals, never joined the treaty: India, Israel, and
Pakistan; a fourth, North Korea, announced its withdrawal in
2003 and is believed to have a few nuclear weapons. Under
Articles II and III, member states that had not conducted a
nuclear test prior to 1968 are obligated not to acquire nuclear
weapons and to accept monitoring of their civilian nuclear
programs through safeguards administered by the International
Atomic Energy Agency ("IAEA"). Article IV recognizes the right
"to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
Geneva Conventions, the United States does not accept that it is a customary rule
applicable to nuclear weapons. See id. at 153-54. The United States is not a party to
Additional Protocol I. The United States appears to accept that the requirement of
proportionality includes consideration of effects on the environment. See, e.g., ARMY,
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 28, at 350 n.81.
276. FinalDocument, supranote 15, at 19.
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peaceful purposes" and provides for "the fullest possible
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information" for peaceful uses, notably nuclear
reactor powered generation of electricity. Five states that had
carried out nuclear tests prior to 1968-China, France, Russia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States-are acknowledged
by Article IX to have nuclear weapons but are obligated by
Article VI to pursue nuclear disarmament. Article VIII provides
for the convening of a conference every five years to review the
operation of the treaty.
Pursuant to Article X, the 1995 Review and Extension
Conference decided to extend the treaty's duration indefinitely.
In connection with that decision, the conference adopted
procedures to strengthen the review process, "Principles and
Objectives on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament,"
("Principles and Objectives") and a resolution calling for efforts
to make the Middle East free of nuclear weapons. 277 The
Principles and Objectives provide, inter alia, for "systematic and
progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the
ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons," negotiation of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ("CTBT") by 1996, and
commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Materials Cut-off
Treaty ("FMCT") banning production of fissile materials for use
in nuclear weapons.
The 2000 Review Conference adopted "Thirteen Practical
Steps for Disarmament," which built on the "Principles and
Objectives." Among the steps are: an unequivocal undertaking to
accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals; signatures
and ratifications to bring the CTBT into force (its negotiation
was concluded in 1996 as promised); negotiating an FMCT; USRussian bilateral reductions through the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty ("START") process; application of the
principle of irreversibility to arms control and disarmament
measures; development of verification capabilities; and
diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies.2 78
277. For the package of decisions adopted in 1995, see 1995 NPT Review and
Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, Final Document, pt. 1, annex, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.1995/32 (1995)
[hereinafter 1995 NPT Review].
278. For the Practical Steps for Disarmament, see 2000 Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, FinalDocument, 14-
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Despite the robust development of the NPT regime at the
1995 and 2000 conferences, in the following decade there was
widespread concern that it was deteriorating. The nuclear
weapon states, particularly the United States, largely failed to
implement the Practical Steps for Disarmament. Under the
George W. Bush Administration, the United States even rejected
some of the commitments made in 2000, notably to ratify the
CTBT and to pursue verified US-Russian reductions through the
START process. No efforts were made to implement the 1995
Middle East resolution. Nonproliferation restraints appeared to
be eroding. North Korea acquired nuclear weapons in defiance
of treaty obligations. Much apprehension was aroused by the
Iranian program to acquire nuclear fuel production technology,
which is inherently also capable of producing materials for
nuclear weapons, and Iran's concomitant refusal to follow
directives of the IAEA and the Security Council. Especially in the
United States, where the September 11 attacks heightened
awareness of the risk of terrorist use of nuclear weapons by
nonstate actors, attention turned to means of preventing
nonstate actor trafficking in and acquisition of nuclear-weaponsrelated material and technology. Under the pressure of those
and other factors, the 2005 Review Conference failed to yield an
agreed outcome.
Accordingly,. in the period preceding the 2010 Review
Conference, there was a widely held conviction that the regime
should be strengthened by a reaffirmation and elaboration of the
bargain underlying the NPT: most states' renunciation of nuclear
weapons in return for the negotiation of nuclear disarmament
and for support for "peaceful uses" of nuclear energy. This led to
an outcome of the Review Conference generally regarded as a
success, though not perceived as decisive in and of itself in
revitalizing the regime.27 9 The Final Document of the 2010

15, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF. 2000/28 (Vol. I, Pt. 1) (2000) [hereinafter 2000 NPT
Review]. A standalone version, with
unofficial headers, is available at
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/13point.html. For more detail on the
1995 and 2000 conferences, and an account of the failed 2005 Review Conference, see
generally Jonathan Granoff, Symposium, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and Its 2005
Review Conference: A Legal and PoliticalAnalysis, 39 N.Y.U.J. INT'L. L. & POL. 995 (2007).
279. For an overview of the Final Document, see Beatrice Fihn, Summary of the 2010
NPT Final Outcome Document, NPT NEWS IN REv., June 1, 2010, at 4, available at
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/NIR2010/No21.pdf.
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Review Conference ("Final Document") includes the following
key provisions.
Document
Final
the
nonproliferation,
Regarding
encourages states parties to accept enhanced IAEA inspection
powers ("Additional Protocol") and to consider establishing
multilateral mechanisms to assure supply of fuel for nuclear
reactors. It does not specifically address issues of noncompliance
raised by the Iranian and other nuclear programs but generally
underscores the importance of complying with nonproliferation
obligations and addressing all compliance matters by diplomatic
means. Regarding peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Final
Document reaffirms the Article IV right to such uses and stresses
the need to meet the highest possible standards of nuclear
security and safety. Regarding the need for "universality,"
bringing in states outside the treaty, the Final Document, inter
alia, calls for a 2012 conference on the subject of a Middle
Eastern zone free of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
and the appointment of a facilitator to make it happen.
Regarding disarmament, the Final Document reaffirms the
Practical Steps on Disarmament ("Practical Steps") adopted by
the 2000 Review Conference. Building on the Practical Steps, it
specifies that "[a]ll States parties commit to apply the principles
of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the
implementation of their treaty obligations." The Final Document
also contains innovative commitments on disarmament,
including an affirmation of the need for all states to make special
efforts to establish a framework to achieve a world without
nuclear weapons coupled with an acknowledgement of the UN
Secretary-General's proposal for negotiation of a convention or
framework of instruments to that end; a commitment by the
nuclear weapon states, inter alia, to "promptly engage" on
"rapidly moving" toward the reduction of the overall global
stockpile, diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security
policies, and to report on the results of the engagement to the
2014 preparatory meeting for the 2015 review; and the
affirmation of the need to comply with IHL.
2.

The IHL Commitment in the NPT Context

The IHL provision in the Final Document agreed by the
2010 NPT Review Conference is as follows: "The Conference
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expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirms the
need for all States at all times to comply with applicable
international law, including international humanitarian law."280
The context of this provision is important; it comes in a section
of the
Final
Document
entitled
"Conclusions
and
recommendations for follow-on actions," and is inserted in Part I
of that section, "Nuclear Disarmament," under "Principles and
Objectives." The chapeau for Part I reads:
In pursuit of the full, effective and urgent
implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4
(c) of the 1995 decision entitled "Principles and objectives
for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament," and
building upon the practical steps agreed to in the Final
Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the
Conference agrees on the following action plan on nuclear
disarmament which includes concrete steps for the total
elimination of nuclear weapons[.]281
The agreement set forth in Part I, Nuclear Disarmament,
was reached in the context of a proceeding-a review
conference-authorized by Article VIII of the NPT "to review the
operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of
the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised."28 2 It
was adopted through the strengthened review process, which, the
1995 Review and Extension Conference specified, "should look
forward as well as back ...

and identify the areas in which, and

the means through which further progress should be sought in
the future."28 3
Because it strongly supports the non-use of nuclear weapons,
the IHL commitment contributes to the realization of the first
preambular provision of the NPT: "Considering the devastation
that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the
consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such
a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of
280. FinalDocument, supra note 15, at 19.
281. Id. (emphasis added).
282. Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 27, art. VIII
(emphasis added).
283. See 1995 NPT Review, supra note 277, at 8.
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peoples . . . ."284 Non-use, and the acknowledgement of legal
requirements supporting non-use, also contributes to nuclear
disarmament by reinforcing the illegitimacy of nuclear weapons
and helping to create an environment of trust in which
disarmament negotiations can succeed. It therefore contributes
to the realization of preambular provisions on nuclear
disarmament and to Article VI.285
This point comes through in the brilliantly phrased
commitment adopted by the 2000 Review Conference to a
"diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to
minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to
facilitate the process of their total elimination."2 8 6 That
commitment and other 2000 Review Conference commitments
were reaffirmed by the 2010 Review Conference.2 87 Further,
Action 5 of the action plan on nuclear disarmament contained in
the 2010 Final Document calls upon the nuclear weapon states to
"promptly engage" to, inter alia, "further diminish the role and
significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security
concepts, doctrines and policies."28 8 Understanding of the
connection between non-use and disarmament indeed goes back
to the origins of the NPT. After the NPT was opened for
signature on July 1, 1968, the Soviet Union and the United States
placed specific measures before the predecessor to today's
Conference on Disarmament, the Eighteen-Nation Committee
on Disarmament, where the NPT had been negotiated. Under a
284. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supranote 27, pmbl.
285. Relevant preambular provisions are these: "[d]eclaring their intention to
achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to
undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament," and
[d]esiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening
of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture
of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the
elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their
delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control.
Id. Article VI provides: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Id. art. VI.
286. 2000 NPT Review, supra note 278, at 15.
287. Final Document, supra note 15, at 19 ("The Conference reaffirms the
continued validity of the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000
Review Conference.").
288. Id. at 21.
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heading taken from Article VI, they proposed an agenda
including "the cessation of testing, the non-use of nuclear weapons,

the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons
use, the cessation of manufacture of weapons and reduction and
"289
subsequent elimination of nuclear stockpiles .
The action plan on nuclear disarmament and the IHL
commitment included within it are not per se legally binding.290
Though it is an "agreement" of a conference of states, it is not
accompanied by the procedures for treaties including signature
and ratification. But, the action plan was adopted by a review
proceeding provided for by the treaty, as part of the
strengthened review process agreed to in connection with the
1995 legally binding decision to extend the treaty indefinitely. It
represents states parties' collective understanding of the appropriate
means for implementation of Article VI. Implementation of action-

plan commitments consequently would be strong evidence that
states parties are complying with Article VI and the NPT. This
point certainly applies to the IHL commitment, due to the close
interconnection with the application of IHL to the realization of
core purposes of the NPT, prevention of nuclear war, and
disarmament. This conclusion is reinforced by the legal principle
of good faith.
289. Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, Final Record
of the Three Hundred and Ninetienth Meeting, Verbatim Record,

1

93, Aug. 15, 1968,

ENDC/PV. 390 (emphasis added).
290. Nonetheless, at least when commitments made as part of an agreement by a
review conference identify means integral to implementation of a treaty obligation, they
appear to supply legal criteria for assessment of compliance. See Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties art. 31(3) (a), May 23 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention] (proividing that "subsequent agreementis] between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions" shall be taken into
account in interpreting a treaty; Carlton Stoiber, The Evolution of NPT Review Conference
FinalDocuments, 1975-2000, 10 NONPROLIFERATION REv. 126, 127 (2003); Peter Weiss,
John Burroughs, & Michael Spies, The Thirteen PracticalSteps: Legal or Political?,LAWYERS

COMMITrEE ON NUCLEAR POLICY, (May 2005), http://www.1cnp.org/disarmament/npt/
13stepspaper.htm. Contra Christopher Ford, InterpretingArticle VI of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 14 NONPROLIFERATION REV. 401, 411-13 (2007). The

argument that such commitments supply legal criteria for assessment of compliance
seems persuasive, for example, with respect to the principles of verification and
irreversibility as applied to disarmament pursuant to Article VI agreed by the 2000 and
2010 NPT review conferences. For some commitments, however, alternative means of
meeting treaty obligations are possible. Regarding the NPT IHL commitment,
determination of its exact legal status in the NPT context is less important because in
any case states are legally obligated to comply with IHL independently of the NPT.
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The Principle of Good Faith

"Good faith is a fundamental principle of international law,
without which all international law would collapse," declared
Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, former President of the ICJ.2 9 '
Good faith "is the guarantor of international stability," Judge
Bedjaoui explained, because it allows one state to foresee the
behavior of its partner.2 9 2 States acting in good faith take into
account other states' legitimate expectations. 2 9 3 Essentially, good
faith means abiding by agreements in a manner true to their
purposes and working sincerely and cooperatively, by
negotiations or other means, to attain agreed objectives. 294
One key aspect of the principle is codified in Article 26 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides:
"Pacta sunt servanda: Every treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in goodfaith."29 5 The ICJ
has elucidated the requirement, stating that the "principle of
good faith obliges the Parties to apply [a treaty] in a reasonable
way and in such a manner that its purpose can be realized."2 96 At
least where circumstances had rendered implementation of
treaty provisions as originally agreed impossible, the court went
so far as to say that "it is the purpose of the Treaty, and the
intentions of the parties in concluding it, which should prevail
over its literal application."2 9 7
A treaty review conference is a collaborative process aimed
at assessing achievement of treaty objectives and mapping further
action to meet those objectives. When successful, a conference is
an instance of states cooperating in good faith to advance agreed
objectives. Good faith can subsequently be further demonstrated
291. Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, Good Faith, International Law, and Elimination
of Nuclear Weapons, Keynote Address, 18 (May 1, 2008), available at
http://www.Icnp.org/disarmament/2008May01eventBedjaoui.pdf [hereinafter Keynote
Address].
292. Id. at 19.
293. Id. at 19-20.
294. See generallyJOHN BURROUGHS ET AL., THE IMPERATIVE OF GOOD FAITH: CIVIL
SOCIETY PRESENTATION TO THE 2009 PREPARATORY COMMITTEE MEETING FOR THE 2010

NPT REVIEW (2009), available at http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/
prepcomO9/ngostatements/GoodFaith.pdf.
295. Vienna Convention, supranote 290, art. 26 (emphasis added).
296. Case Concerning the Gabaikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997
I.C.J. 7, 1 142 (Sept. 25).
297. Id.
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by implementing agreed actions. In the case of the 2010 NPT
IHL commitment, good faith mandates that states make sincere
efforts to bring their policies into line with the IHL, as discussed
below.

B.

Policy Implications of the NPT IHL Commitment
1. Analysis of the IHL Commitment

The IHL commitment was negotiated during the May 2010
meeting of the Review Conference. The original version of the
provision read: "The Conference expresses its deep concern at
the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of
nuclear weapons, and reaffirms the need for all States to comply
with international humanitarian law at all times."298 In closed
negotiations over the provision as first proposed, France
reportedly called for its deletion, and the United Kingdom at
least expressed doubts about it. In its idiosyncratic argument
before the ICJ in 1995, France remained silent on the application
of IHL to the use of nuclear weapons, arguing instead that absent
an express prohibition, their use is "authorized in the event of
the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence." 299
As revised and approved by the Conference, the second part
of the provision was changed to call for compliance with
"applicable
international
law,
including
international
humanitarian law." Why the reference to "applicable" law? First,
because IHL governs methods and means of warfare, the extent
of its application in time of peace is controversial. It is also
sometimes a matter of dispute as to whether an armed conflict
has commenced or ended. Second, the use of the phrase "at all
times" could raise the question of whether that phrase should be
added elsewhere in the Final Document when it calls for
compliance with an NPT obligation. Modification of "at all
times" by "applicable law" assuaged these concerns.
298. 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons, May 3-28, 2010, Subsidiary Body I: Revised Chairman's Draft
Action Plan, 1, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2010/MC.1/SB.1/CRP.1/Rev.1 (2010).
299. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, Public
Sitting 66 (Nov. 1, 1995, 10 a.m.), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
95/5927.pdPPHPSESSID=824406939531fa21a815a5coa3365dfe.
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The reference to "applicable international law" is
regrettable because it provides a textual basis for invoking selfdefense and reprisal, though this could have been done in any
case. And because it provides a textual basis for arguing that IHL
is not applicable in time of peace, it cuts against the argument
that doctrines generally contemplating use of nuclear weaponsas opposed to signals in specific circumstances of armed
conflict-are "threats" contrary to IHL. IHL, however, is not the
only basis for challenging the lawfulness of general doctrines of
"deterrence"; there is no question that the UN Charter's
prohibition of threat or use of force, which the ICJ found
potentially applicable to doctrines of "deterrence," is in effect
whether or not an armed conflict is underway.
Nonetheless, the provision remains powerful. The reference
to the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of "any" use of
nuclear weapons directly joined with the call for compliance with
law "at all times" supports the position that use of nuclear
weapons is unlawful in all circumstances. Importantly, the insistence
on compliance with applicable internationallaw "at all times" weighs
against any suggestion that IHL bends or wavers depending upon the
circumstances of armed conflict. That includes the "extreme
circumstance of self-defence in which the very survival of a State
is at stake" about which the ICJ could not reach a conclusion;
self-defense as invoked by the French; or second use in "reprisal"
purportedly aimed at deterring further attacks.
In light of the foregoing, the IHL provision adopted by the
Review Conference develops the norm of non-use of nuclear
weapons. Indeed, when combined with the practice of no-nuse
since the US atomic bombings of Japanese cities, the provision
strengthens the case for a customary legal obligation categorically
prescribing non-use. The welcome US statement in its Nuclear
Posture Review is also relevant here: "It is in the U.S. interest and
that of all other nations that the nearly 65-year record of nuclear
non-use be extended forever."30 0 That statement was reinforced
later in 2010 when President Obama and Prime Minister Singh

300. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, supranote 256, at ix.
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jointly stated their support for "strengthening the six decade-old
international norm of non-use of nuclear weapons."30 1
The ICJ had rejected the argument that the record
demonstrates a customary obligation of nonuse on the ground
that doctrines of deterrence show that there is no shared legal
opinion that use is illegal.30 2 However, the ICJ also observed that
the
adoption each year by the General Assembly, by a large
majority, of resolutions recalling the content of resolution
1653 (XVI), and requesting the member States to conclude a
convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons in any
circumstance, reveals the desire of a very large section of the
international community to take, by a specific and express
prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a significant step
forward along the road to complete nuclear disarmament.30 3
The court continued: "The emergence, as lex lata, of a
customary rule specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear
weapons as such is hampered by the continuing tensions between
the nascent opinio juris on the one hand, and the still strong
adherence to the practice of deterrence on the other." 304 With
the Review Conference statement, the world is moving closer to
the day when it can be said that the practice of non-use has
become a custom of non-use recognized by law. A declaration
signed in 2011 by former ICJ judges and other eminent experts
in international law and diplomacy indicates that a prohibition
on the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons in all
circumstances indeed is crystallizing as a matter of customary
law.305
301. Joint Statement by President Obama and Indian Prime Minister Singh,
November 19, 2010, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/
08/joint-statement-president-obama-and-prime-minister-singh-india.
302. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996

I.C.J. 226,

66-67 (July 8).

303. Id. 1 73.
304. Id.
305. SIMMONs FOUND. & INT'L Assoc. OF LAWYERS AGAINST NUCLEAR ARMs
[IALANA],
VANCOUVER DECLARATION: LAW'S IMPERATIVE FOR THE URGENT
ACHIEVEMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE WORLD (2011), available at http://www.lcnp.
Developed by
org/wcourt/Feb201lVancouverConference/vancouverdeclaration.pdf.
The Simons Foundation and IALANA, its signatories include Christopher G.
Weeramantry, former Vice President of the IC) and current President of IALANA;
Mohammed Bedjaoui, who was ICJ President when it handed down its advisory opinion
on nuclear weapons; Louise Doswald-Beck, Professor of International Law, Graduate
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2.

Implementation of the IHL Commitment

For NPT nuclear weapon states, good faith fulfillment of the
commitment to comply with international law, including IHL
with respect to nuclear weapons, would be demonstrated in part
by visible and conscientious efforts to address the incompatibility
of existing doctrines and deployments with the requirements of
IHL and to change their policies accordingly.
Implementation of the IHL commitment also demands
more expeditious and energetic implementation of the
obligation to achieve the global elimination of nuclear weapons
through good-faith negotiations. This is the dynamic of what has
been called "humanitarian disarmament" as applied to cluster
munitions and anti-personnel mines-elimination of inhumane
weapons incapable of compliance with IHL 30 6 -and was also the
logic of the global treaty bans on possession and use of chemical
and biological weapons.
The International Committee of the Red Cross has squarely
recognized that disarmament is implied by nuclear weapons'
incompatibility with IHL and humanitarian values. In an April
2010 statement, ICRC PresidentJakob Kellenberger said that "the
ICRCfinds it difficult to envisage how any use of nuclear weapons could
be compatible with the rules of internationalhumanitarianlaw."307 He
added:
The position of the ICRC, as a humanitarian
organization, goes - and must go - beyond a purely

legal

analysis. Nuclear weapons are unique in their destructive
Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, and co-author of a major
International Committee of the Red Cross study of international humanitarian law
(HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 225); Ved Nanda, Evans University
Professor, Nanda Center for International and Comparative Law, University of Denver
Sturm College of Law; Jayantha Dhanapala, former UN Under-Secretary-General for
Disarmament Affairs; and Gareth Evans, QC, former Foreign Minister of Australia who
served from 2008-2010 as Co-Chair of the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament. A list of signatories is available at http://www.lcnp.org/
wcourt/Feb201 1VancouverConference/signatories322 1.pdf.
306. See KEN BERRY ET AL.,

MONTEREY INST. OF INT'L STUD.,

DELEGITIMIZING

NUCLEAR WEAPONS: EXAMINING THE VALIDITY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 37-39 (2010),
available at http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/pdfs/delegitimizing-nuclear-weapons-may-

2010.pdf.

307. Jacob Kellenberger, President of the Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Statement:
Bringing the Era of Nuclear Weapons to an End (Apr. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/nuclear-weapons-statement200410 (emphasis added).
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power, in the unspeakable human suffering they cause, in
the impossibility of controlling their effects in pace and time,
in the risks of escalation they create, and in the threat they
pose to the environment, to future generations, and indeed
to the survival of humanity. The ICRC therefore appeals
today to all States to ensure that such weapons are never
used again, regardless of their views on the legality of such
use.
In the view of the ICRC, preventing the use of nuclearweapons
requires fulfilment of existing obligations to pursue negotiations
aimed at prohibiting and completely eliminating such weapons
through a legally binding international treaty. It also means

preventing their proliferation and controlling access to
materials and technology that can be used to produce
them.30 8
The ICJ also effectively recognized the implication. The UN
General Assembly asked the court about the legality of the threat
or use of nuclear weapons. The court, however, determined that
an adequate response to the question required interpretation of
the NPT Article VI disarmament obligation. The court declared,
with all judges concurring, that there is an "obligation to pursue
in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control."3 0 The court also noted that the "pattern
until now has been for weapons of mass destruction to be
declared illegal by specific instruments," citing the Biological
Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.3 10
While an in-depth analysis of everything that good faith
compliance with the disarmament obligation requires is beyond
the scope of this work,3 1' it is sufficient to note that good faith
would be demonstrated by implementing NPT commitments
agreed at the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences-among them
308. Id. (emphasis added).
309. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 1 105(2)F.

310. Id. 1 57.
311. For more detail, see, e.g., John Burroughs, The U.S. Nuclear PostureReview and
InternationalLaw, MICH. INT'L LAW., Summer 2010, at 1, 3-6; John Burroughs, A Global
Undertaking: Realizing the Disarmament Promise of the NPT, MIDDLE POWERS INITIATIVE
BRIEFING PAPER, Jan. 21-22, 2010, available at http://www.gsinstitute.org/mpi/pubs/

AtlantaBriefingPaper_2010.pdf.
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bringing the test-ban treaty into force, negotiating a treaty
banning production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, and
accomplishing verified, irreversible reductions leading to
elimination of all nuclear weapons. Good faith also requires
refraining from actions undermining the achievement of the
disarmament objective.3 12
Beyond those steps, good faith would be demonstrated by
commencing negotiations directly aimed at achieving the global
elimination of nuclear weapons through a multilateral
agreement.3 13 That is a process called for by a large majority of
the world's states in the UN General Assembly314 and in NPT
review proceedings, but so far refused by the NPT nuclear
weapon states except China. Encouragingly, though, in the 2010
NPT action plan on nuclear disarmament, the nuclear weapon
states agreed to the following provision which at least recognizes
the need for a comprehensive approach:
The Conference calls on all nuclear-weapon states to
undertake concrete disarmament efforts and affirms that all
States need to make special efforts to establish the necessary
framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear
weapons. The Conference notes the five-point proposal for
nuclear disarmament of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, which proposes, inter alia, consideration of
negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement
on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing
instruments, backed by a strong system of verification.3 15
312. In the NPT context, Judge Bedjaoui explained, good faith proscribes "every
initiative the effect of which would be to render impossible the conclusion of the
contemplated disarmament treaty" eliminating nuclear weapons globally pursuant to
Article VI. Keynote Address, supra note 291, at 22. Modernization of nuclear forces and
infrastructure by the United States and other states with nuclear arsenals, especially
absent serious multilateral efforts at negotiating nuclear disarmament, would seem to
fall under this proscription.
313. See IALANA & INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT HARVARD LAW SCH., GOOD
FAITH NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS:
REQUEST FOR AN ADVISORY OPINION FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 25

(2009), available at http://cnp.org/disarmament/2009.07.ICJbooklet.pdf

[hereinafter

GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS].

314. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 64/55, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/55 (Dec. 2, 2009).
315. Final Document, supra note 15, at 20, 1(B) (iii). For Ban Ki-moon's remarks first
setting out his proposal for nuclear disarmament, see Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General,
United Nations, Address to the East-West Institute: The United Nations and Security in a
Nuclear-Weapon-Free World (Oct. 24, 2008), available at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2008/sgsm1 1881.doc.htm.
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Once negotiations, of whatever kind, are commenced, they
must be conducted in good faith. That requires making the
negotiations meaningful, showing willingness to compromise,
avoiding delay, and generally negotiating with a genuine intent
to achieve a positive result.3 16 Indeed, the ICJ held that the
disarmament obligation encompasses both conduct and result.3 17
States must not only negotiate with serious efforts to achieve the
elimination of nuclear weapons but must actually achieve that
result.
It is high time that debate focuses on the best way to achieve
the global elimination of nuclear weapons in the most
expeditious, thorough, and practical manner. The question now
is not whether, but how. The Secretary-General's proposal brings
a new clarity to the debate.

CONCLUSION
Weapons are intended to protect that which society values,
including morality and law. Because of their indiscriminate effect
and overwhelming destructive capacity, nuclear weapons can
hardly be reconciled with the most basic values of civilization. It
is incoherent to plan for the use of nuclear weapons and even
threaten to use them even if the only purpose is allegedly to
prevent their use. Such a practice is not only unstable but
intrinsically violates the highest values society seeks to protect.
It is not hyperbole to say that the challenge to human
civilization presented by nuclear weapons may be the
consummate test of the human race's ability to survive. The very
existence of nuclear weapons requires that human societiesboth the most technologically efficient and affluent of societies
and societies still struggling to establish their place in the
world-overcome the historical and contemporary human
burden of aggression and tribalism. Containing the dangers of
such human dynamics is one of the purposes of law.
Pursuing peace and security based on the rule of law is
necessary for any just society. International humanitarian law is
an existing body of law universally recognized as necessary to
316. See GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 313, at 30-31.
317. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996

I.C.J. 226, 1 99 (July 8).
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limit war and preserve the possibility of a just peace. That law
must now be rigorously applied to nuclear weapons. Some are
satisfied that, because they imagine there are uses of nuclear
weapons that do not violate IHL, the law need not be applied to
the main contemplated uses of nuclear weapons. This is akin to
making the exception the basis for establishing a norm.
As this Article systematically demonstrates, it is only a
cognitively creative exception to real-world practice that can even
describe an instance in which the use of a nuclear weapon would
not violate IHL. Is it not time that the nations and people of the
world demanded that states with nuclear weapons bring their
practices into strict compliance with the law? A first step would be
a public disclosure of the actual targeting of the weapons and the
impacts that uses would have, followed by a rigorous adjustment
to eliminate all uses that violate the standards of IHL. Such steps
would surely invigorate the security enhancing process of moving
rapidly to a nuclear-weapons-free world.
As long as powerful states pursue international peace and
security as well as their own national interests through
threatening the use of nuclear weapons, and as other less
economically and politically developed states seek nuclear
weapons as an "equalizer" to hold more powerful states at bay,
the specter of the use of these weapons, with potentially
apocalyptic results, will remain, threatening the survival of
human civilization. Not only is this unacceptably risky, but it is
also being done in contravention of that which society is allegedly
protecting: civilized values and institutions.
World leaders are increasingly articulating aspirations to
obtain the peace and security of a nuclear-weapons-free world.
The legal basis of this pursuit is compelling, and there are
increasing dangers of proliferation with the spread of nuclear
technology. These dynamics make this an opportune moment.
The required tools to effectively reign in the hazard-IHL and
the verification techniques, law, and institutions used for nuclear
arms control and for elimination of other weapons-exist. It is
time these tools are used. Lawyers and citizens, states and
statesmen, peoples and leaders from countries big and small,
must find the wisdom to see that the use and threat of use of
nuclear weapons is unlawful under long-established principles of
international law and is morally and humanly unacceptable. They
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must act accordingly, renounce policies of possible use of the
weapons, and move forward decisively on a program of action to
eliminate them.

